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Abstract
This Comment explores the background of the conflict in Northern Ireland and an example of
alleged past corruption in the UK security forces’ use of covert agents. It discusses the legal back-
ground surrounding the enactment of RIPA, including the direct legislative history of the Act and
the Act’s indirect history, as evidenced through decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.
It also examines the statutory framework of RIPA focusing on the provisions that serve as a check
on the use of covert human surveillance in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. Finally, this
Comment argues that RIPA is insufficient in providing full accountability and protection of human
rights, as it is compelled to do under both international and domestic human rights law.
POLICING UNDERCOVER AGENTS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM: WHETHER THE REGULATION OF
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INTRODUCTION
On the evening of Sunday, February 12, 989, Patrick Finu-
cane was having dinner with his wife and three children at their
home in Belfast, Northern Ireland.1 A prominent criminal de-
fense and human rights lawyer 2 who often represented high pro-
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suggestions. I also want to thank my family and friends for their patience and support.
1. See Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers: The Case of
Northern Ireland, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 87 (1994) (noting date of Finucane's mur-
der); see also Howard J. Russell, New Death Breathes Life Into Old Fears: The Murder of
Rosemary Nelson and the Importance of Reforming the Police in Northern Ireland, 28 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 199, 202 (1999) (stating that Finucane was shot at his home in Belfast);
Mark Tran, Men Arrested Over Belfast Solicitor's Murder: Break in the Case of Pat Finucane,
GUARDIAN (UK),July 28, 1999, at 19 (reporting that Finucane was shot in February 1989
as he was sitting down to dinner); Michael Finucane, They Killed My Father: Michael
Finucane on the Anniversary of a Murder Which is Still the Source of Explosive Scandal, GUARD-
IAN (UK), Feb. 13, 2001, at 19 (recalling date of incident when author, son of Patrick
Finucane, witnessed shooting of his father); AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED KINGDOM: PATRICK
FINUCANE'S KILLING: OFFICIAL COLLUSION AND COVER-UP 1 (2000) [hereinafter OFFICIAL
COLLUSION], available at http://web.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/0/523233FE25
A2E6CC802568A30069E90C?Open (stating that Finucane resided in Belfast, Northern
Ireland, with his wife and three children).
2. See Russell, supra note 1, at 202 (noting Finucane's eminent reputation as civil
rights attorney); see also OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing Finucane's
prominent reputation as human rights lawyer); Chris Ryder, Gunmen Murder IRA Solici-
tor, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Feb. 13, 1989, at 1 (discussing Finucane's representation of
numerous high profile Republican defendants). Patrick Finucane had a reputation for
challenging allegedly corrupt activities by Northern Ireland's police force, the Royal
Ulster Constabulary ("RUC"). See NICHOLAS DAVIES, TEN-THIRTY-THREE 155-56 (1999)
(detailing Finucane's effective legal challenges to controversial killings by Royal Ulster
Constabulary ("RUC") of Catholics, and corresponding dislike of Finucane by both Brit-
ish government and Protestant loyalists); see also Richard Harvey, A Climate of Complicity
for a Murder in Ulster, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1989, at 7 (discussing Finucane's successful
legal challenges to British abuses in Northern Ireland). Finucane's death came shortly
after he had convinced an Irish trial court to compel RUC officers involved in a 1983
killing of Irish Republican Army ("IRA") members to testify in court. See Russell, supra
note 1, at 202 (explaining that Finucane planned to use testimony of RUC officers to
investigate controversial police killings of Nationalists). Throughout the testimony at
1282
POLICING UNDERCOVER AGENTS IN THE UK 1283
file republican and Irish Republican Army ("IRA") 3 members,
this trial, Finucane suggested that he hoped to probe into an alleged "shoot to kill"
campaign the police had initiated against Irish Republicans and Nationalists. Id.
Throughout a thirty year period of conflict between Republicans (individuals com-
mitted to joining the six counties, which are currently part of the UK-held, Northern
Irish province, to the southern continental Republic of Ireland) and Unionists (those
committed to maintaining Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom), which
has been historically termed "The Troubles," there has been much suspicion over the
notion that secret, officially sanctioned killings of Provisional IRA members occurred,
where the RUC had been either directly or indirectly involved. Linda Moore, Policing
and Change in Northern Ireland: The Centrality of Human Rights, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1577, 1580-81 (1999). The RUC's alleged "shoot to kill" policy became the subject of
heightened political debate in the early 1980s, in light of a succession of questionable
killings of IRA members by the RUC. See DAVIES, supra, at 140-55 (providing descrip-
tion of alleged "shoot to kill" policy of RUC and accompanying negative public re-
sponse); see also Russell, supra note 1, at 202 (noting that Finucane's desire to probe
into alleged "shoot to kill" campaign led many to believe security forces played role in
Finucane's murder); Moore, supra, at 1580-81 (detailing human rights concerns that
have been raised regarding RUC's conduct during conflict, including allegations of
"shoot to kill" policy in 1980s, and of collusion between RUC and loyalist paramilitary
organizations). See generally BBC: History: Policing in Northern Ireland: Wars and Conflict:
The Troubles: Fact Files: Key Themes-Policing, BBC 1, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/
war/troubles/factfiles/policingshtml (providing overview of antagonism between RUC
and IRA).
3. See LAWYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 13-15 (1993) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE]
(discussing that Irish Republican Army ("IRA") is republican paramilitary organization
that has used violence to reach its political goals). Commentators note that the IRA is
Northern Ireland's largest republican paramilitary group. See Kieran McEvoy, Human
Rights, Humanitarian Interventions and Paramilitary Activities in Northern Ireland, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND 217 (Colin J. Har-
vey ed., 2001) (explaining that IRA is most significant republican paramilitary group in
terms of both size and activity); see also TOM F. BALDY, BATTLE FOR ULSTER 50 (1987)
(classifying IRA as most threatening republican paramilitary group on basis of quantity
of terrorist activity conducted). The IRA was founded nearly 80 years ago, in an effort
to fight for a united Ireland. See id. at 40 (noting formation of IRA by Michael Collins
in 1919); see also HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra, at 14-15 (stating that IRA
campaign to fight for united Ireland began in aftermath of First World War). In 1969,
the IRA split into two factions: the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA ("PIRA"). See
id. 14-15 (contextualizing split of IRA into Offical and Provisional ("PIRA") branches in
view of increasing violence between Catholics and Protestants). The Official IRA took
on a more socialist approach, while the PIRA became more militant. See F7aherty, supra
note 1, at 94 (identifying PIRA as more dangerous -and active than Official IRA); see also
BALDY, supra, at 50 (discussing that following breakup of IRA, PIRA spent year training
and acquiring weaponry). Commentators note that the PIRA initially chose to use vio-
lence in an effort to defend Catholics against loyalist paramilitary attacks (paramilitary
groups working to defend what they consider to be a united-United Kingdom, includ-
ing Northern Ireland), though they later began to go on the offensive, using violence to
help achieve their own political goals. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE, Supra, at
15 (explaining that violent unionist response to peaceful Catholic civil rights demon-
strations led some Catholics to also choose violence); see also BALDY, supra, at 50 (char-
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Finucane had received a number of death threats over the
years. 4 These threats were realized when Finucane and his fam-
ily began to eat dinner that evening. Two armed gunmen broke
into Finucane's home, ran into the kitchen where the family was
eating, and shot Finucane fourteen times in front of his wife and
children.5 Patrick Finucane was killed in the attack,6 and his
wife, Geraldine, was injured.7 A Protestant paramilitary group,
the Ulster Freedom Fighters ("UFF")8 claimed responsibility for
acterizing PIRA members as disagreeing with non-violent tactics by Catholics who al-
lowed themselves to remain open to armed attack from Protestants, while remaining
unarmed themselves). See generally Flaherty, supra note 1, at 93-95 (providing overview
of political and social setting of Troubles); HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra, at
13-16 (discussing historical background of Troubles).
4. See Finucane, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that Finucane was subject of both di-
rect and indirect harassment by RUC); see also OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 2
(discussing that prior to Finucane's death, threats escalated in both frequency and se-
verity and were channeled via Finucane's clients as well as in telephone calls to his
home). See generally Flaherty, supra note 1, at 97-118 (providing overview of conditions
in Northern Ireland abusive to defense lawyers, ranging from intimidation to operating
difficulties under emergency system); Russell, supra note 1, at 202-03 (explaining that
many Catholic and Nationalist lawyers subject to harassment and threats were reluctant
to complain to inactive RUC).
5. See Finucane, supra note 1, at 19 (providing first person account of scene of
crime, wherein author watched his father get shot, while sister, brother, and mother
similarly bore witness); see also John Mullin, Confession to Lawyer's Killing 'Given RUC in
1990', GUARDIAN (UK), Aug. 24, 1999, at 5 (reporting that Finucane was shot fourteen
times by two masked gunmen); Russell, supra note 1, at 202 (stating that Finucane's
murder was first murder of lawyer in history of Northern Ireland's conflict); David
Hearst, Lawyers in Need of Defence: The Implications of Sunday's Murder of a Belfast Solicitor
and Recent Attacks on his Profession's Impartiality in the Province, GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 14,
1989 at 23 (discussing that Finucane had habit of keeping front door unlocked as ges-
ture indicating he was available to all); LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BE-
YOND COLLUSION: THE UK SECURITY FORCES AND THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE,
Feb. 12, 2002, at 10 [hereinafter BEYOND COLLUSION] (noting that Finucane was shot at
least dozen times at close range in head and neck).
6. See Finucane, supra note 1, at 19 (describing watching armed gunmen shoot and
kill his father); see also Mullin, supra note 5, at 5 (reporting that Finucane was killed in
attack at his home).
7. See OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that Geraldine's injuries
were likely caused by ricocheted bullet).
8. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 63 (characterizing Ulster Freedom Fighters ("UFF")
as right-wing loyalist paramilitary group, targeting republican paramilitaries and, on
occasion, ordinary Catholics). The Ulster Freedom Fighters ("UFF") is a cover name
for a loyalist paramilitary organization, the Ulster Defense Association ("UDA"), whose
intention it is to maintain the union of Northern Ireland with the United Kingdom. See
McEvoy, supra note 3, at 219 (noting that Ulster Defense Association ("UDA") and UFF
are same organization); see also BALDY, supra note 3, at 63 (stating that all loyalist
paramilitary groups oppose republican goal of united Ireland). The UDA surfaced in
1969 as a response to the more militant approach taken by up by the PIRA. See BALDY,
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the incident.'
It was not long after Finucane's murder that claims of offi-
cial collusion began to emerge.10 Evidence materialized indicat-
ing that Finucane's murder was executed with the assistance of
members of Northern 4reland's, police force, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary ("RUC"), t as well as the British Army,12 facilitated
supra note 3, at 64 (noting date when UDA was created); see also McEvoy, supra note 3,
at 219 (explaining that loyalists believe themselves entitled to use violence due to threat
republicans pose to UK); HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 15 (dis-
cussing reemergence of UDA and UVF in response to resurfacing of active IRA). At its
peak, the UDA had a membership that reached into the thousands. See BALDY, supra
note 3, at 127 n.111 (noting that UDA's peak membership was 26,000 members in
1972). The UDA was banned in 1992 because of its engagement in terrorism. See id. at
65 (explaining ,that UDA and UFF were banned because murders had been claimed
under both names).
9. See Tran, supra note 1, at 19 (reporting on loyalist group claiming responsibility
for Finucane's murder); see also Jim Dee, Ex-CID Officer: Special Branch Muddied Probe,
BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 6, 2002, at 18 (explaining that UDA/UFF claimed responsibility
for Finucane's murder); Harvey, supra note 2, at 7 (stating that UFF bragged about
killing of Finucane); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 87 (explaining that UFF alleged Finu-
cane was member of PIRA); OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that claim
by UDA/UFF that Finucane was member of PIRA is denied by Finucane's family and
friends, as well as by official police statements). See generally BRITISH IRISH RIGHTS
WATCH, JUSTICE DELAYED . . .: ALLEGED STATE COLLUSION IN THE MURDER OF PATRICK
FINUCANE AND OTHERS, Feb. 2000, at 1, available at http://www.birw.org/justice.html
[hereinafter JUSTICE DELAYED] (alleging that UK security forces colluded with UDA in
murder of Finucane).
10. See OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that claims of official collu-
sion in Finucane's murder have increased dramatically over time); see also Russell, supra
note 1, at 202 (stating that defense lawyers have continuously voiced concern over col-
lusion within RUC, given ineffectiveness of RUC's investigation); Flaherty, supra note 1,
at 99 (asserting that collusion between security forces and loyalist paramilitaries is not
isolated phenomenon); JUSTICE DELAYED,' supra note 9, para. 1.1 (stating that claims of
official collusion include participation by British army intelligence, RUC, Director of
Public Prosecutions ("DPP") and government minister); AMNESTY INT'L, IN RE THE MUR-
DER OF PATRICK FINUCANE AND THE CASE FOR A PUBLIC INQUIRY. JOINT OPINION FOR AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 29, 1999, para. 1, available at: http://www.barhuman
rights.org/pdfs/patrickfinucane.pdf [hereinafter IN RE THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINU-
CANE] (discussing widespread calls for establishment of public inquiry in light of allega-
tions of collusion).
11. See JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, para. 1.1 (explaining controversy that has
arisen regarding RUC and British army involvement in Finucane murder); see also IN RE
THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 10, para. 2 (discussing that 1999 investi-
gation uncovered that RUC officer had prior knowledge of plans to kill Finucane);
Russell, supra note 1, at 203 (indicating that RUC has been involved in covering up
murder of Finucane and several others); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 104 (stating concern
on behalf of many solicitors that RUC has shown little resolve in uncovering intimida-
tion and collusion in Finucane case). See generally OFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at
2-4 (detailing evidence linking RUC to Finucane's murder).
12. See Nick Hopkins, Sinister Role of Secret Army Unit: Undercover in Ulster Police Inves-
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by their use of undercover government informers. 13 Commenta-
tors express that the murder of Patrick Finucane is evidence of a
system of covert human surveillance in Britain corrupted
through its inability to create a system of accountability gov-
erning the use of informers." Commentators discuss that such a
situation was enabled by the lack of a statutory framework gov-
erning the use of informers in the United Kingdom, both before
and during the time of Finucane's murder.15 In the year 2000,
the British Parliament decided to take measures to curtail the
tigate Claims of Collusion with Paramilitaries, GUARDIAN (UK), Apr. 28, 2001, at 2 (alleging
that British Army played role -in Finucane's murder); see also Finucane, supra note 1, at
19 (explaining role of secret branch of UK army intelligence services in facilitating
Finucane's murder); Brits: Dark Side of War (BBC News Broadcast, May 31, 2000), tran-
script available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/northern_ireland/newsid_
766000/766926.stm [hereinafter Brits: Dark Side of War] (discussing role of army intelli-
gence agent, Brian Nelson, in murder of Finucane and others). See generally DAVIES,
supra note 2, at 155-69 (providing narrative of role of Brian Nelson, in murder of Pat-
rick Finucane); ROB LEWIS, FISHERS OF MEN (1999) (detailing role of British Army's
Force Research Unit ("FRU") in clandestine operations).
13. See Hopkins, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that Brian Nelson, British agent, pro-
vided important intelligence information to Fincane's killers); IN RE THE MURDER OF
PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 10, paras. 4, 5(a) (indicating that RUC informer William
Stobie played role in Finucane's murder); see also JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, para.
1.2 (alleging that British army double agent, Brian Nelson, colluded with UDA in mur-
der of Finucane). See generally Ed Moloney, Frightened Informer Claimed RUC Forced his
Silence, SUNDAY TRIB. (UK), Jun. 27, 1999, at 1 (providing overview of role of RUC in-
former in murder of Finucane); Finucane, supra note 1, at 19 (detailing background of
both Stobie's and Nelson's roles in Finucane's killing).
14. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 56-63 (discussing creation of RUC cul-
ture wherein quest for intelligence gained through informers was deemed more impor-
tant than bringing agents and potential agents to justice); see also Insight: Policing the
Police (UTV television broadcast, May 1, 2001), transcript available at http://www.serve.
com/pfc/pf/pf04052001a.html [hereinafter Insight: Policing the Police] (explaining that
RUC Special Branch officers tampered with evidence in order to prevent information
on double agents from coming to light); Dee, supra note 9, at 18 (reporting that RUC
Special Branch officers attempted to cover up confession of one of Finucane's killers);
Richard Norton-Taylor & Nick Hopkins, Security Service Told RUC That it Could Put Spying
on Terrorists Ahead of Solving Crime, GUARDIAN (UK),Jun. 14, 2001, at 11 (reporting that
UK intelligence service, M15, gave RUC Special Branch powers allowing force to give
priority to recruiting terrorist informers over solving crime). See generally BEYOND COL-
LUSION, supra note 5 (providing extensive overview of allegations of UK security force
collusion and cover-up of murder of Patrick Finucane).
15. See Peter Neyroud & Alan Beckley, Regulating Informers: The Regulation of Investi-
gatory Powers Act, Covert Policing and Human Rights, in INFORMERS: POLICING, POLICY,
PRACTICE 164 (Roger Billingsley et al. eds., 2001) (explaining that concerns about po-
tential miscarriages of justice in use of informers prompted many to question UK's
traditional lack of statutory authority governing use of informers); see also Alisdair A.
Gillespie, The Legal Use of Participating Informers, 5 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2000),
available at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue5/gillespie5.html (discussing that UK's
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potential for such abuse.16 It did so by drafting the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ("RIPA").17
Part I of this Comment explores the background of the con-
flict in Northern Ireland and an example of alleged past corrup-
tion in the UK security forces' use of covert agents. Part I addi-
tionally discusses the legal background surrounding the enact-
ment of RIPA, including the direct legislative 'history of the Act
and the Act's indirect history, as evidenced through decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights. Part II examines the stat-
utory framework of RIPA focusing on the provisions that serve as
a check on the use of covert human surveillance in the United
Kingdom and Northern Ireland. Part II also explores criticisms
of RIPA's provisions in light of both domestic and international
human rights standards. Part III argues that RIPA is insufficient
in providing full accountability and protection of human rights,
previous lack of statutory authorization for use of informers may have been in conflict
with human rights responsibilities).
16. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, Explanatory Notes, 2000, ch. 23, para.
3 (Eng.) [hereinafter RIPA Explanatory Notes]; see Neyroud, supra note 15, at 165 (not-
ing that Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act ("RIPA"), was enacted in response to
regional human rights pressures criticizing UK's lack of statutory framework governing
use of informers). Paragraph 3 of the ExplanatoryNotes to the Regulation of Investiga-
tory Powers Act 2000 provides that:
The purpose of the [Regulation of Investigatory Powers] Act is to insure that
the relevant investigatory powers are used in accordance with human rights.
These powers are: the interception of communications; the acquisition of
communications data (e.g. billing data); instrusive surveillance (on residential
premises/in private vehicles); covert surveillance in the course of specific op-
erations; the use of covert human intelligence sources (agents, informants,
undercover officers); access to encrypted data.
RIPA Explanatory Notes, supra, para. 3.
17. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, intro. (Eng.). See
Neyroud, supra note 15, at 165 (explaining that RIPA was drafted to meet UK human
rights obligations). The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was enacted on July 28,
2000. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, intro. (Eng.). In its intro-
ductory paragraph, RIPA states:
An Act to make provision for and about the interception of communications,
the acquisition and disclosure of data relating to communications, the carry-
ing out of surveillance, the use of covert human intelligence sources and the
acquisition of the means by which electronic data protected by encryption or
passwords may be decrypted or accessed; to provide for Commissioners and a
tribunal with functions and jurisdiction in relation to those matters, to entries
on and interferences with property or with wireless telegraphy and to the car-
rying out of their functions by the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence
Service and the Government Communications Headquarters; and for con-
nected purposes.
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as it is compelled to do under both international and domestic
human rights law.
I. BACKGROUND SURVEILLANCE
The conflict in Northern Ireland has been an extremely di-
visive force in both the Protestant and Catholic communities of
that region."8 Commentators note that this inter-community
tension penetrated both the police force and government of
Northern Ireland.19 An anti-Catholic bias on behalf of certain
government and security forces in Northern Ireland has posed
particular difficulties regarding the use of covert informers.20
Under a traditionally unregulated system of informer use in
Northern Ireland, covert government agents have engaged in
18. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 33-47 (describing historical circumstances that led
to, and perpetuated Troubles); see also TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA 341-53 (2002) (dis-
cussing rise of republican paramilitary group, IRA, in response to Troubles); J. BOYER
BELL, THE IRISH TROUBLES: A GENERATION OF VIOLENCE 1967-1992, at ix-xvii (1993)
(providing overview of social conflict between Catholics and Protestants during Trou-
bles); McEvoy, supra note 3, at 217-20 (discussing activities of sectarian paramilitary
groups in response to conflict in Northern Ireland); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 93-95
(providing synopsis of Catholic and Protestant inter-community conflict since begin-
ning of Troubles).
19. See DAVIES, supra note 2, at 37-50 (noting antagonism between Catholic com-
munity and security forces in Northern Ireland); see also BALDY, supra note 3, at 66-70
(explaining that most prominent political parties in Northern Ireland are divided along
Protestant and Catholic sectarian lines); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 103-04 (discussing
that RUC treats members of Protestant and Catholic communities differently); HUMAN
RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 40 (contending that RUC failed to address
complaint made on behalf of Catholic community adequately); Linda Moore & Mary
O'Rawe, A New Beginning for Policing in Northern Ireland?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY
AND DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND 186-87 (Colin J. Harvey ed., 2001)
(discussing historic antagonism between RUC and Catholic communities in Northern
Ireland).
20. See DAVIES, supra note 2, at 100-18 (alleging that anti-Catholic sentiment on
behalf of FRU's covert informer and his FRU handlers led to targeting of Catholic indi-
viduals); see also BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 24-25 (discussing prior Protestant
paramilitary activities of informer used by British Army); JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9,
para 1.2 (contending that members of RUC and FRU encouraged loyalist murders of
Catholics); IN RE THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 10, at 2 (alleging that
RUC took no action on tips it received on imminent murder of Catholic and Republi-
can defense lawyer, Patrick Finucane); but see Beatrix Campbell, Comment & Analysis:
State Killings Must be Investigated: The Irish Peace Declaration Shows Britain now Accepts its
Responsibility, GUARDIAN (UK), Aug. 10, 2001, at 12 (discussing allegations of security
force collusion in murder of prominent loyalist leader, Billy Wright); Canadian Judge to
Head Investigation, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at 6 (discussing upcoming independent
judicial inquiry into security force collusion into controversial killing of both Protestant
and Catholic individuals).
2002] POLICING UNDERCOVER AGENTS IN THE UK 1289
unlawful activities targeting Catholic individuals and many re-
main unaccountable for their actions.21
A. The Troubles
The Northern Irish conflict began when Northern Ireland
was created as a political entity in 1920.22 Believing that inde-
pendence had not been granted to the entirety of Ireland after
Irish Partition, many in the Catholic community were unwilling
to accept the legitimacy of the Northern Irish government.23
Discord between Protestants and Catholics on the basis of their
political views eventually emerged into violent struggle, which
has persisted to the current day.2 4 Experts discuss that the parti-
san politics of the Northern Irish landscape also infiltrated the
governmental policy and security force sentiment in the re-
21. See Neyroud & Beckley, supra note 15, at 164 (explaining that prior to RIPA's
enactment, UK had no statutory authority governing use of informers); see also Gilles-
pie, supra note 15 (discussing potential human rights conflicts within UK's previously
unregulated informer authorization system); Hopkins, supra note 12, at 2 (alleging that
FRU played role in murder of Finucane); IN RE THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE,
supra note 10, paras. 4, 5(a) (contending that both FRU and RUC facilitated murder of
Finucane through use of covert informers); BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 29, 37
(indicating that Stobie and Nelson were never successfully prosecuted for murder of
Finucane).
22. See CHRIS RYDER, INSIDE THE MAZE 4 (2001) (explaining that after Irish Parti-
tion, republicans still desired Ireland united, North and South); see also BALDY, supra
note 3, at 40 (describing discord that grew between Protestant majority community and
Catholic minority community after Irish Partition); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 13 (noting
that Northern Irish conflict began after Northern Ireland was created as political en-
tity).
23. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 44 (explaining that Catholic population questioned
legitimacy of Northern Irish government after Irish Partition); see also RYDER, supra note
22, at 4 (indicating that republican desire for autonomous Ireland did not subside after
Irish Partition); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 93 (explaining that many Catholics viewed
Protestant-dominated government of Northern Ireland as illegitimate); COOGAN, supra
note 18, at 341-53 (discussing rise of republican paramilitary group, IRA, in aftermath
of Irish Partition).
24. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 49-66 (characterizing loyalist and republican
paramilitary groups that have used violent means to achieve their sectarian political
goals); see also COOGAN, supra note 18, at 341-53 (explaining rise of violent pjsramilitary
group, IRA, in response to Troubles); Henry McDonald, Loyalists Mock Phony "Peace: It
is Ulster's Unseen War... Violence, Intimidation and Sectarian Attacks-Like that on Daniel
McColgan, OBSERVER (UK), Jan. 20, 2002, at 10 (reporting on contemporary rise in
loyalist paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland); Gerry Moriarty, NIParamilitaries Or-
dered 683from Homes Last Year-Report, IRISH TIMES (Ire.), Mar. 18, 2002 (explaining that
violent threats by loyalist and republican groups led close to 700 families to move from
their homes in 2001).
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25gion. Commentators allege that such bias impacted the use of
covert government informers in both the British army and the
RUC.26 Commentators note that the murder of human rights
lawyer, Patrick Finucane, is an example of how certain covert
agents in Northern Ireland's security forces were able to engage
in illegal activities targeting politically unpopular individuals,
many never held responsible for their actions.2 v
1. History of the Conflict in Northern Ireland
The conflict in Northern Ireland began during the same
struggle that produced autonomy for what is now the Irish Re-
public.28 After World War I, the IRA engaged in a violent gue-
25. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 44 (discussing discriminatory policies enacted by
Protestant majority governing Northern Ireland Parliament after Irish Partition); see
also RYDER, supra note 22, at 5 (discussing UK support for Protestant domination of
Northern Ireland Parliament); Moore & O'Rawe, supra note 19, at 186 (noting that
many Catholics in Northern Ireland perceived RUG to have loyalist/Protestant sympa-
thies); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 103-04 (explaining that RUC treated Catholics and
Protestants in Northern Ireland differently); HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra
note 3, at 50-52 (discussing statement by member of Parliament, Douglass Hogg, criti-
cizing defense lawyers of Republican defendants).
26. See Davies, supra note 2, at 100-18 (alleging that members of FRU encouraged
murder of Catholics through collusion with loyalist paramilitary informer); see also Jus-
TICE DELAYED, supra note 9, para. 1.2 (alleging collusion between FRU, RUC, and loyal-
ist paramilitary informers in murder of Patrick Finucane); BEYOND COLLUSION, supra
note 5, at 24-25 (discussing loyalist sympathies of FRU informer allegedly involved in
murder of Patrick Finucane); IN RE THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 10, at
2 (alleging that RUG chose to take no action on tip it received from loyalist paramilitary
informer regarding imminent murder of Patrick Finucane).
27. See DAVIES, supra note 2, at 155-69 (discussing allegations of FRU involvement
in murder of Patrick Finucane, high profile solicitor, unpopular with both UK govern-
ment and security forces); see also HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at
52-57 (presenting evidence of RUG and British Army collusion into murder of Fincuane
and other politically unpopular individuals); British-Irish Rights Watch, Deadly Intelli-
gence: State Involvement in Loyalist Murder in Northern Ireland: Summary, Feb. 1999, availa-
ble at http://www.lchr.org/media/finucanesumm0299.htm [hereinafter Deadly Intelli-
gence] (summarizing allegations of security force collusion with loyalist paramilitary
groups in sectarian murders in Northern Ireland);JUsTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, paras.
1-9 (detailing allegations of security force collusion into controversial killings of Patrick
Finucane, Rosemary Nelson, Terence McDaid, and Gerard Slane); Campbell, supra
note 20, at 12 (discussing allegations of State collusion into murders of politically un-
popular individuals such as Patrick Finucane, Rosemary Nelson, and Billy Wright); BE-
YOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 37 (noting that Stobie and Nelson were never success-
fully prosecuted for their alleged involvement in murder of Patrick Finucane).
28. See RYDER, supra note 22, at 4 (explaining that republicans continued to desire
autonomy for whole of Ireland after independence was granted to only part of what was
claimed to be Ireland proper); see also BALDY, supra note 3, at 40 (describing conflict
arising after Irish partition between Protestant majority and Catholic minority in newly
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rilla campaign, fighting for Irish autonomy from Great Britain. 21
Ultimately Great Britain partially conceded, granting indepen-
dence to twenty-six of the thirty-two counties that comprised the
territory under dispute. 30 The twenty-six predominantly Catho-
lic counties created a constitution to become the Republic of
Ireland.3 ' The other six counties became Northern Ireland, a
self-governing entity within the United Kingdom.32 Northern
Ireland was dominated by a Protestant majority committed to
maintaining ties with the UK 33 and a significant Catholic minor-
created Northern Ireland); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 13 (stating that Northern Ireland
was created at same time as Irish Republic was born). See generally Jeremy A. Colby,
Getting to Peace: Avoiding Roadblocks on the Path to Peace in Northern Ireland, 14 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (providing overview of historical context of conflict in North-
ern Ireland).
29. See RYDER, supra note 22, at 1-4 (describing rise of IRA as political organization
aimed at establishing home rule for Ireland); see also BALDY, supra note 3, at 40-43 (ex-
plaining that IRA began campaign in 1919 to establish autonomy for Ireland); Flaherty,
supra note 1, at 93 (noting that Protestant groups actively resisted goal of Irish auton-
omy); HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 13 (explaining that IRA
began guerilla campaign for Irish autonomy after World War I).
30. See RYDER, supra note 22, at 4 (contexualizing grant of autonomy to southern
26 counties of Ireland within backdrop of violent IRA campaign for Irish home rule);
see also BALDY, supra note 3, at 43 (noting that Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 created domin-
ion status for predominantly Catholic counties in southern part of Ireland); BRICE DICK-
SON, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND 3 (1993) (explaining that partition of
Ireland created separate legal and judicial systems for North and South); HUMAN
RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 13-14 (discussing that southern 26 counties
were granted British dominion status as Irish Free State); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 93
(noting that 26 counties were referred to as Irish Free State in time after granting of
independence but before adoption of Irish Constitution).
31. See DICKSON, supra note 30, at 3 (stating that Irish .Constitution was created in
1937); see also BALDY, supra note 3, at 119 (contending that creation of Irish Republic in
1949 further solidified divisions between Protestant majority in North and Catholic ma-
jority in South); RYDER, supra note 22, at 4 (indicating that creation of Irish Republic
fell short of republican desire for autonomous Ireland, consisting of all 32 counties);
Flaherty, supra note 1, at 93 (explaining that subsequent to creation of Irish Constitu-
tion in 1937, Irish Republic left British Commonwealth).
32. See BELL, supra note 18, at 23 (explaining that after Irish Partition, Northern
Ireland was run by devolved government, with Parliament known as "Stormont"); see
also BALDY, supra note 3, at 43 (explaining that Northern Ireland maintained represen-
tation at UK Parliament, in addition to functionings of Stormont); HUMAN RIGHTS AND
LEGAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 14 (noting that Stormont began to operate as political
body in Northern Ireland in 1922); DICKSON, supra note 30, at 4 (discussing wide range
of internal matters dealt with by Stormont).
33. See DICKSON, supra note 30, at 3-4 (explaining that, after Partition, Northern
Ireland was governed by Parliament of Northern Ireland); see also BALDY, supra note 3,
at 44 (noting that Catholics initially did not accept legitimacy of Northern Ireland);
Flaherty, supra note 1, at 93 (stating that six counties that comprise Northern Ireland
encompass province of Ulster). Protestants wanting to preserve union with the United
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ity who desired an Ireland that was united, both North and
South. 4
As part of its self-governing mechanism, Northern Ireland
established the Northern Ireland Parliament, also referred to as
"Stormont," in 1922. 5 For the first fifty years of its existence,
Stormont was dominated by a Protestant, unionist majority.36
This majority instituted a series of policies effecting discrimina-
tion against Catholics in areas such as housing, employment, and
voting rights. 31 Catholic nationalists and republicans initially re-
Kingdom are generally referred to as "unionists." Colby, supra note 28, at 3-4. More
extreme unionists, particularly those who advocate violence, are generally referred to as
"loyalists." Id.
34. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 44 (explaining that Catholics initially expressed
their dissatisfaction with creation of Ireland by choosing not to participate in political
mechanism); see also RYDER, supra note 22, at 4 (discussing that after Northern Ireland
was created, Catholic minority population did not feel' that struggle for complete inde-
pendence of Ireland had been realized); Flaherty, supra.note 1, at 93-94 (explaining
that Catholic minority population in Northern Ireland expressed their dissatisfaction
with State in number of ways, including civil rights demonstrations, participation in
paramilitary activities, and non-participation in State governance); HUMAN RIGHTS AND
LEGAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 14 (recognizing that Northern Ireland was traditionally
two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic). Catholics committed to making North-
ern Ireland part of the Irish Republic are commonly termed "nationalists." Colby, supra
note 28, at 4. Those Catholics who take a more extreme stance, often advocating the
use of violence, are commonly termed "republicans." Id.
35. See DICKSON, supra note 30, at 4 (noting that Stormont handled matters includ-
ing local government, law and order, health and social services, education, planning,
internal trade, industrial development and agriculture); see also BALDY, supra note 3, at
43 (explaining that, in addition to maintaining its own Parliament, Northern Ireland
had representation at UK Parliament in Westminster); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 93
(discussing that for first half-century of its institution Stormont controlled nearly all
government functions, with sole exceptions of taxation and defense); HUMAN RIGHTS
AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 14 (explaining that Stormont began operation in
1922).
36. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 44 (discussing that Protestants dominated Stormont
through Unionist Party); see also RYDER, supra note 22, at 5 (explaining that British
government supported Unionist domination of Northern Ireland governance); Fla-
herty, supra note 1, at 93 (noting that many Catholics rejected Protestant dominated
Stormont as illegitimate); Alexander Linn, Note, Reconciliation of the Penitent: Sectarian
Violence, Prisoner Release, and Justice Under the Good Friday Peace Accord, 26J. LEGIS. 163,
165-66 (2000) (discussing division of Northern and Southern Ireland according to pre-
existing majority populations within counties).
37. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 44 (contending that discriminatory policies enacted
by loyalists in Stormont alienated Catholics and enforced loyalist belief that Catholics
were disloyal to State); see also Linn, supra note 36, at 167 (discussing formation of
Catholic civil rights movement in response to injustices perceived by Catholic commu-
nity); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 93 (noting that loyalist majority in Stormont enacted
discriminatory policies against Catholics regarding housing, employment, and voting
rights); Brice Dickson, Protection of Human Rights-Lessons from Northern Ireland, 3 EUR.
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sponded by engaging in peaceful civil rights demonstrations.3 8
However, experts discuss that the unionist response to these pro-
tests soon became violent.39 A cycle of violence ensued, wherein
many Catholics and Protestants turned to more extreme
paramilitary organizations, which used violent means to accom-
plish their political goals.4"
Commentators note that the role of the police force in
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 213, 215 (2000) (explaining that discriminatory treatment of
Catholics during Stormont-era strongly affected attitudes of Catholic community in
Northern Ireland).
38. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 46-47 (describing rise of Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association, operating as peaceful civil rights organization aimed at challenging
discrimination against Catholics); see also DAVIES, supra note 2, at 37 (explaining that
Catholic civil rights movement was not focused on creating united Ireland, rather, it
fought for social justice for Catholics in Northern Ireland); Christopher McCrudden,
Equality, in HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALrIY AND DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL IN NORTHERN IREI AND
77 (ColinJ. Harvey ed., 2001) (commenting that anti-discrimination legislation was not
introduced in Northern Ireland until 1973); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 93-94 (noting
that Catholic civil rights movement was modeled after civil rights movement in United
States); Colby, supra note 28, at 3 (contending that Troubles began when civil rights
conflicts started in 1969).
39. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 47 (explaining that Ulster Volunteer Force ("UVF")
was created in 1966 and began using violence against peaceful Catholic civil rights
movement); see also McEvoy, supra note 3, at 218 (noting that loyalist paramilitary
groups have traditionally used violence against Catholics in order to support union be-
tween Northern Ireland and UK and to compensate for perceived failure of UK to
address threats posed by republicans to that union); Moore & O'Rawe, supra note 19, at
186-87 (remarking that RUC also used violence against Catholic working class commu-
nities); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 94 (noting that violent response by Protestant groups
encouraged some Catholics to move away from non-violent tactics); Linn, supra note 36,
at 168 (noting that victims of paramilitary violence included civilians and children);
Molly Murphy, Note, Northern Ireland Policing Reform and the Intimidation of Defense Law-
yers, 68 FODaMAm L. REv. 1877, 1882 (2000) (discussing violent unionist response to
both peaceful and violent Catholic means of promoting civil rights).
40. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 50-53 (describing re-emergence of IRA in 1969,
using violence in response to violent Protestant attacks on Catholics and in order to
further political goals); see also McEvoy, supra note 3, at 217 (indicating that from 1973
to 2001, 2,300 people were victims of paramilitary punishment shootings, injuring
knees, thighs, elbows and/or ankles, and from 1983 to 2001, 1,700 individuals victims of
paramilitary punishment beatings, generally involving attacks with baseball bats, sticks
with nails, iron bars, or other heavy objects); RYDER, supra note 22, at xiii (revealing that
from 1969 to end of March 2000, average of one person was killed every three days, one
person injured every six hours, shooting occurred every six hours, and explosion hap-
pened every fourteen hours in Northern Ireland); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 94 (explain-
ing that British troops were sent to Northern Ireland in 1969 to respond to increased
paramilitary violence and remain in Northern Ireland to current day); HUMAN RIGHTS
AND LEGAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that violence peaked in -1972 with 467
political fatalities).
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Northern Ireland, the RUC,4 added a distinctive dimension to
the Northern Irish conflict.4 2 For the duration of its existence,
the RUC was predominantly Protestant in composition.43
Catholics and Nationalists were often disinclined to address their
concerns to a force with so little representation on behalf of
their community.44 Further, experts agree that the RUC did not
41. See Brice Dickson, The Powers of the Police, in CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN IRE-
LAND ch. 3 (1990) (indicating that RUC was police force in Northern Ireland and detail-
ing powers of RUC in Northern Ireland). On November 4, 2001, the RUC officially
changed to the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Police (Northern Ireland) Act,
2000, ch. 32, pt. 1, para. 1(1) (Eng.). The Police Act states: "The body of constables
known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary shall continue in being as the Police Service of
Northern Ireland (incorporating the Royal Ulster Constabulary)." Id.; see Police Service of
Northern Ireland, available at http://www.psni.police.uk/welcome.shtml (noting date of
changeover from RUC to Police Service of Northern Ireland ("PSNI")); see also Britain:
Strip 'Royal' From Ulster Police, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 20, 2000, § 1, at 16 (discussing that
changes implemented in transforming predominantly Protestant RUC into Police Ser-
vice of Northern Ireland will likely enjoy greater support from Catholics). But see Jim
Dee, Skeptics Skewer Policing Reform, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 6, 2002, at 3 [hereinafter Skep-
tics Skewer Policing Reform] (surveying critics, who note that PSNI will not be representa-
tive of Catholic population for at least 15 or more years and who believe PSNI to be
substantially similar in composition to RUC).
42. See BALDY, supra note 3, at 47 (indicating that RUC was implicated in certain
loyalist attacks on Catholics); see also Moore & O'Rawe, supra note 19, at 186 (stating
that many nationalists/Catholics believed RUC to have unionist/Protestant sympa-
thies); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 103-04 (discussing unequal treatment of Catholic and
Protestant community members on behalf of RUC); see also Murphy, supra note 39, at
1898 (describing difficulty of RUC in addressing complaints of Catholic citizens in
Northern Ireland); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI, To SERVE WITHOUT FAVOR: POLIC-
ING, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 15 (1997) [hereinafter
To SERVE WITHOUT FAVOR] (alleging that policing system in Northern Ireland has al-
lowed human rights abuses to occur). See generally, Moore, supra note 2, at 1578-82
(discussing history of RUC's inter-community role in Northern Ireland).
43. See Moore & O'Rawe, supra note 19, at 200 (reporting that RUC was eight
percent Catholic, while Catholics account for over forty percent of population in North-
ern Ireland); see also RYDER, supra note 22, at 7-8 (explaining that Catholics historically
viewed RUC as repressive device of Unionists); Moore, supra note 2, at 1599 (explaining
that RUC was predominantly male and Protestant); Skeptics Skewer Policing Reform, supra
note 41, at 3 (noting both RUC and PSNI to be 92 percent Protestant). See generally
Moore & O'Rawe, supra note 19, at 186-88 (providing overview of history of RUC in
Northern Ireland).
44. See Flaherty, supra note 1, at 104 (stating that Catholics and Nationalists gener-
ally went to RUC to voice complaints only as last resort); see also Moore, supra note 2, at
1578 (noting Catholics may have viewed RUC as partisan due to association with gov-
ernment counter-terrorist policy it carried out). But see Linn, supra note 36, at 167-68
(noting that Catholics initially welcomed security force involvement, deployed in order
to protect Catholics from loyalist paramilitary violence). The results of a survey con-
ducted in 1999 reveals the impact of Catholic and RUC antagonism on Catholic percep-
tions of the RUC. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, A
NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND chs. 3-20 (1999). This survey found
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have a history of effectively handling complaints made by mem-
bers of the Catholic community.45
Throughout the conflict, security forces have been responsi-
ble for approximately 360 deaths.46 The RUC alone was respon-
sible for at least fifty of those deaths.47 To date, however, no
RUC officers have been successfully prosecuted for any alleged
misconduct relating to these killings.48
2. A Case Study: The Murder of Patrick Finucane
Patrick Finucane was a'successful and well-respected human
rights and criminal defense attorney in Northern Ireland.4 9 Rep-
resenting a number of high-profile Republicans and IRA mem-
bers, though, certain individuals associated Finucane with the
politics of his clients.50 Commentators note that Finucane was
that more Catholic than Protestant respondents felt that the RUC treated the two com-
munities on an unequal basis. Id. The same report also revealed that approximately
75% of Catholics believed that there were too few Catholics on the police force, where
only 60% of Protestants shared that view. Id. On the basis of these, and other, findings,
the report concluded that Protestant/Unionist perceptions and Catholic/Nationalist
perceptions of the police are sharply different. Id.
45. See HuMAN RIGHTS AND LECAL DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 40 (interviewing North-
ern Irish solicitors who brought complaints on behalf of Catholics and indicating that
their clients' complaints were not addressed); see also Flaherty, supra note .1, at 103-04
(discussing ineffective handling of complaints made by defense lawyers of Catholics and
Nationalists); Moore, supra note 2, at 1578 (noting that hostility toward RUC increased
in Catholic community, due to day to day harassment by RUC, use of plastic bullets, by
RUC, accusations of security force collusion with paramilitaries and alleged "shoot to
kill" policies); Murphy, supra note 39, at 1989 (noting that many defense lawyers in
Northern Ireland are dubious about quality of investigation made into police com-
plaints).
46. See Moore, supra note 2, at 1580 (explaining that British Army and RUC were
responsible for 360 deaths during Northern Irish conflict).
47. See id. (noting proportion of deaths caused by RUC).
48. See id. (contending that security services seem to be immune from successful
prosecution for alleged misconduct).
49. See Russell, supra note 1, at 202 (explaining that Finucane had prominent rep-
utation as civil rights attorney in Northern Ireland); see also BEYOND COLLUSION, supra
note 5, at 4-5 (detailing controversial cases Finucane successfully tried); DAVIES, supra
note 2, at 155-56 (discussing successful legal challenges Finucane made to controversial
RUC practices); Ryder, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that Finucane represented number of
high-profile Republican and IRA members); OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 1
(explaining that Finucane challenged UK government concerning human rights is-
sues).
50. See Flaherty, supra note 1, at 100 (noting that government officials in UK have
accused lawyers of sharing politics of the clients they represent); see also OFIACIAL COiL
LUSION, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing that RUC detectives identified Finucane with his
Republican clients); Finucane, supra note 1, at 19 (contending that both RUC and
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murdered after being wrongly accused of being an IRA member
and republican activist by loyalist paramilitary groups and the
RUC. 51 Evidence that certain covert government agents in both
others associated Finucane with paramilitary activities some of his clients engaged in);
Moloney, supra note 13, at I (explaining that UDA considered Finucane to be member
of PIRA); BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 7 (providing example of government
official who publicly associated Northern Irish solicitors with the Republican affiliations
of their clients).
Commentators note that the vulnerability of defense lawyers of Republicans and
IRA members increased because of at least one government actor, Douglas Hogg MP,
then Parlimentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office. See BEYOND COLLU-
SION, supra note 5, at 7 (discussing that Hogg's statements significantly increased vul-
nerability of Finucane); see also Sarah Schaefer, Parliament: Northern Ireland: Unionist
Anger at Finucane Inquiry, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), May 6, 1999, at 8 (quoting Labour
MP as believing Hogg's statement to be one of most dangerous statements ever spoken
by government minister); Ryder, supra note 2, at 1 (reporting that lawyers and politi-
cians accused Hogg of laying foundation for Finucane's murder with his comments);
Harvey, supra note 2, at 7 (stating that both moral and political responsibility for
Fincuane's murder lies with British government and, in particular, Douglas Hogg). In a
Parliamentary debate over a bill on the floor, Hogg declared that "certain solicitors" in
Northern Ireland were "unduly sympathetic" to the IRA's cause. Hansard, House of
Commons, Standing Committee B., Jan. 17, 1989, at col. 508.
Hogg stated:
I have to state as a fact, but with great regret, that there are in Northern Ire-
land a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the
IRA.- [Interruption]. I repeat that there are in the Province a number of
solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA. One has to bear
that in mind.
Id. at col. 508. Hogg repeated the statement that "certain solicitors" were "unduly sym-
pathetic" to the IRA 11 times in the course of the House of Commons Debate. Harvey,
supra note 2, at 7. Hogg's statement immediately caused a public uproar in Northern
Ireland, where people believed that Hogg's remarks supported claims by loyalist groups
that defense solicitors were IRA members and, therefore, valid targets. See BEYOND COL-
LUSION, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that Hogg's statement caused immediate protest in
Northern Ireland, in particular among Northern Ireland legal community); see also Har-
vey, supra note 2 (referring to Hogg's comments as "dangerous and unspecified allega-
tion"); Ryder, supra note 2, at 1 (reporting that members of Northern Ireland Associa-
tion of Socialist Lawyers called for Hogg's resignation after controversial statements).
See generally Nick Hopkins & Richard Norton-Taylor, Police Talk to Ex-Minister Hogg About
Ulster Killing, GUARDIAN, June 13, 2001, at 1 (reporting that Hogg conceded that he had
been briefed by RUC regarding activities of lawyers in Belfast who had alleged republi-
can sympathies).
Less than a month after Hogg made his remarks, Patrick Finucane was murdered.
See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that Hogg's comments were made on
January 17, 1989). Finucane was murdered on February 12, 1989. See Flaherty, supra
note 1, at 87 (noting that Finucane was murdered at his home on February 12, 1989).
Neither Hogg, nor the UK government, has ever issued an apology for the statements
made by Hogg. BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 9.
51. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that RUC officers accused
Finucane of being member of IRA); see also OFFiciAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 2
(explaining that RUC detectives informed loyalist suspects detained in interrogation
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centers that Finucane was involved in IRA); Moloney, supra note 13, at 1 (discussing
that Finucane was referred to as member of PIRA by UDA); HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL
DEFENSE, supra note 3, at 47 (providing examples of comments made by RUC to Finu-
cane's clients, regarding Finucane's involvement in IRA).
Commentators discuss that prior to his death, Patrick Finucane was the subject of
frequent harassment and intimidation by the RUC, through the use of indirect threats.
See, e.g., Finucane, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing that threats began as insults about
Finucane's legal ability). The threats received by Finucane escalated to threats on Finu-
cane's life and in the weeks and months immediately preceding Finucane's death, the
frequency and intensity of these threats increased. Id.; see Russell, supra note 1, at 202-
03 (noting that United Nations ("U.N.") investigation found that Finucane was recipi-
ent of death threats by RUC); OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that vari-
ous Republican suspects represented by Finucane and detained in interrogation centers
stated that detectives alluded to Finucane in derogatory ways and, on some occasions,
communicated death threats to Finucane through his clients). One of Finucane's for-
mer clients reported that police asked him for details about Finucane, and remarked to
him: "Finucane is an IRA man. He's a dead man. He'll be dead within three months."
BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 7. A week before Finucane's murder another of
Finucane's clients was allegedly told by RUC officers: "Fucking Finucane's getting took
out." BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 7. See generally Flaherty, supra note 1, at 97-
107 (providing overview of official harassment of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland);
BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 6-7 (providing additional examples of death threats
communicated to Finucane through his clients). Experts note that such intimidation
generally occurred once the defendant-detainee came into the custody of police. See
Flaherty, supra note 1, at 99 (explaining that most indirect threats to defense lawyers in
Northern Ireland occur in detention centers); see also BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5,
at 5-7 (providing examples of threats communicated through Finucane's detained cli-
ents); Russell, supra note 1, at 205 (stating that threats made against defendants, isola-
tion of suspects, and hostility toward defense lawyers were practices common within
RUC); Murphy, supra note 39, at 1893-97 (discussing examples of alleged threats made
by RUC to both Patrick Finucane and murdered defense solicitor Rosemary Nelson).
In these situations, the detective would often bully and threaten the detainee, and then
make various threatening comments about the detainee's solicitor. See Flaherty, supra
note 1, at 99 (describing method by which indirect threats by RUC were issued to de-
fense lawyers in Northern Ireland). These threatening remarks varied in degree. Id.
Some threats served as attempts to intimidate defendants into changing their mind
about their choice of solicitor. Id. Other, more dangerous threats threatened the lives
of the solicitor representing the defendant. Id.; see Murphy, supra note 39, at 1893
(stating that threatening comments occur so frequently that many clients do not tell
their solicitors about them). See generally Russell, supra note 1, at 205-08 (discussing
abuses in techniques utilized in RUC's police interrogations); Murphy, supra note 39, at
1892-93 (discussing use of RUC threats to interfere with defendant's choice of counsel).
Experts explain that this form of threatening was accomplished in a manner similar to
that used against other defense lawyers of Nationalist and Republican individuals. See
Flaherty, supra note 1, at 98-99 (explaining method by which RUC officers made indi-
rect threats to defense lawyers of Catholic and Nationalist individuals in Northern Ire-
land); see also Russell, supra note 1, at 203 (discussing U.N. accusations of RUC intimi-
dation and harassment of defense lawyers); Murphy, supra note 39, at 1893 (noting that
threats against defense lawyers occur in detention centers, as well as via telephone or in
writing). See generally Russell, supra note 1, at 203 (discussing similarities of threats
aimed at both Finucane and murdered defense solicitor Rosemary Nelson); Murphy,
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the British Army and the RUC targeted Finucane for political
reasons have surfaced since his killing.52 Commentators allege
supra note 39, at 1893-97 (discussing examples of alleged threats made by RUC to both
Finucane and Rosemary Nelson).
52. See JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, para. 1.2 (alleging that member of British
Army participated in loyalist murder of Finucane); see also OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra
note 1, at 1-2 (contending that UDA and security forces colluded in murder of Finu-
cane, whom loyalists claimed was member of IRA); Flaherty, supra note 1, at 99 (stating
that Finucane was targeted because of successful legal challenges he undertook against
security forces); BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that RUC detectives
expressed animosity towards Finucane by derogatorily speaking of him as Catholic).
Since the beginning of the conflict in Northern Ireland, both the RUC and British
Army created specialized units responsible for using different types of covert operations
to fight paramilitary violence. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 22 (describing
creation of specialized covert intelligence units upon onset of Troubles); see also DAVIES,
supra note 2, at 37-38 (discussing creation of FRU in response to growing terrorist
threats in Northern Ireland); see also LEwis, supra note 12, at xv (stating that when
Troubles began, government hastily created number of military units to carry out "reac-
tive" intelligence operation against terrorist groups). See generally BEYOND COLLUSION,
supra note 5, at 22 (describing Tasking and Coordination Groups ("TCGs"), which
functioned as means of integrating intelligence received from various specialized units
in both British army and RUC). Two of these units include the RUC's Special Branch
and the British Army's Force Research Unit ("FRU"). See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra
note 5, at 30 (classifying FRU as example of one of units created under British army to
handle covert operations at beginning of Troubles). Other specialized units that were
created include the RUC's Special Support Units ("SSUs"), the Army's 14th Intelli-
gence Company ("Reconnaissance Unit"), and Special Air Service ("SAS"). Id. at 22.
Overlaying the responsibility of these groups is the MI5, the UK's intelligence service,
responsible for domestic security. Id.
Both the Special Branch and the FRU use covert agents to infiltrate paramilitary
organizations for the purposes of intelligence gathering. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra
note 5, at 21-22 (noting that both Special Branch and FRU had covert agents placed
within UDA); see also IN RE THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 10, para. 4
(noting that William Stobie worked as covert agent for Special Branch at time of Finu-
cane's killing); see alsoJUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 10, para. 1.2 (explaining that Brian
Nelson infiltrated UDA as covert agent by FRU). The objective of the Force Research
Unit was to identify, recruit, and integrate covert agents in all aspects of the community,
with an emphasis placed on gathering intelligence through informers placed within
loyalist and republican paramilitary organizations. See LEWIS, supra note 12, at xv (de-
fining objective of FRU and contending that FRU activities are most sensitive of covert
operations in Northern Ireland); see also DAVIES, .supra note 2, at 42 (emphasizing im-
portance of informer intelligence to FRU's operations). The Special Branch's work
focused on the use of informers and agents within both republican and loyalist
paramilitary organizations. BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 30. It is alleged that
both the Special Branch and FRU double agents have colluded with paramilitary
groups to target politically unpopular individuals, such as Patrick Finucane. See Russell,
supra note 1, at 202-06 (discussing alleged role of RUC in murders of Finucane and
Nelson); see also Norton-Taylor & Hopkins, supra note 14, at 11 (detailing claims that
RUC and MI5 colluded with UDA in murdering Finucane); Finucane, supra note 1, at
19 (claiming that both FRU and RUC colluded with UDA in facilitating murder of
Finucane); JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, para. 10.2 (detailing extensive list of organi-
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that covert security force agents illicitly colluded with paramili-
tary groups to facilitate Finucane's murder and many remained
unaccountable for their actions."
After the murder of Patrick Finucane, a former informer for
the RUC's Special Branch,54 William Stobie, came forward with
evidence alleging RUC collusion in the murder of Patrick Finu-
cane." During the time of Finucane's murder, Stobie worked
zations calling for independent judicial inquiry into murder of Finucane in light of
evidence supporting collusion claims between UDA and UK security forces); Murphy,
supra note 39, at 1893-97 (discussing alleged role of RUC in murder of Finucane and
RUC's response thereto). At least one commentator alleges that this collusion has
taken a variety of forms: directly conspiring with paramilitary groups, failing to prevent
criminal acts for which there is reliable advance notice, or failing to pursue an investiga-
tion where a particular paramilitary group was allegedly involved. See To SERVE WITH-
OUT FAVOR, supra note 42, at 140 (providing examples of alleged collusion by UK secur-
ity forces and paramilitary organizations). In addition, experts contend that policies of
the RUC allowed for a policing culture more interested in its intelligence gathering
operations than the greater interests ofjustice. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at
57 (arguing that police force more concerned with getting intelligence than bringing
agents or potential agents to justice for their possible wrongdoings); see also Norton-
Taylor & Hopkins, supra note 14, at 11 (discussing report that RUC Special Branch had
powers to give priority to recruiting informers over solving crimes); Dee, supra note 9,
at 18 (noting that confessed murderer of Finucane was recruited as informer rather
than prosecuted for crime); Insight: Policing the Police, supra note 14 (alleging RUC and
British army cover-up of murders for purposes of protecting informants); Liam Clarke,
Police Informer Claims he Killed Lawyer in his Home, SUNDAY TIMES (UK), Jan. 13, 2002, at 5
(revealing name of loyalist activist who confessed to murdering Finucane and who is
now allegedly operating as police informer).
53. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 25-29 (discussing alleged involvement
of British army informer in murder of Finucane, and fact that informer has never been
prosecuted for Finucane killing); see also JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, paras. 7.1-7.5
(detailing involvement of RUG in murder of Finucane and noting lack of accountability
of involved members); Russell, supra note 1, at 202 (explaining that ineffectiveness of
RUC to hold accountable those accused of colluding with UDA in murder of Finu-
cane); IN RE THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 10, para. 1 (calling for estab-
lishment of public inquiry in light of collusion allegations by UK government); Hop-
kins, supra note 12, at 2 (alleging that full extent of British army's involvement in Finu-
cane's murder has not yet been uncovered).
54. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 30 (classifying Special Branch as intelli-
gence unit created under RUC, handling covert operations).
55. See IN RE THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 10, paras. 4, 5(a) (dis-
cussing admission of William Stobie regarding his role as Special Branch agent in mur-
der of Patrick Finucane); see also Moloney, supra note 13, at 1 (explaining that Stobie
was hired as informer for Special Branch after Special Branch became aware that Stobie
had been involved in murder); Tran, supra note 1, at 15 (reporting that Stobie con-
fessed to have telephoned his Special Branch handlers on night of shooting, warning
them of imminent loyalist attack); Mullin, supra note 5, at 5 (reporting that William
Stobie told RUC in 1990 that he supplied and disposed of two weapons used in Finu-
cane murder). Stobie additionally claimed to have assisted in planning Finucane's mur-
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both as a Special Branch informer, planted in the role of a quar-
termaster for the UDA.56 In the week immediately preceding
Finucane's murder, Stobie claims that he was ordered by his
UDA commander to provide guns for an operation involving the
imminent murder of a high profile republican target.57 Stobie
claims to have informed the Special Branch of this information,
and information concerning the identity of the UDA com-
mander in charge of the operation.58  However, Stobie claims
that the Special Branch chose not to follow up on the leads he
had provided.59 In some of his accounts, Stobie also claims that
der. See generally Moloney, supra note 13, at 1 (detailing narrative provided by William
Stobie regarding his role in RUC and UDA at time of Finucane's killing).
56. See Mullin, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining that Stobie had been Special Branch
agent inflitrated into UDA for two years at time of Finucane's murder); see also
Moloney, supra note 13, at 1 (providing extensive account of Stobie's role as Special
Branch agent working undercover in UDA); IN RE THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE,
supra note 10, para. 4 (noting that Stobie's role as Special Branch informant has been
confirmed by Crown); BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 30 (noting that Stobie was
informer in UDA from approximately 1987 through 1990 and served as UDA quarter-
master in West Belfast); Michael Posner, The Patten Commission Report on Policing in
Northern Ireland: Statement of Michael Posner: Before the United States House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations: Subcommittee on International Operations and Human
Rights, Sept. 24, 1999, available at http://www.lchr.org/n.ireland/nitestimonyO999.htm
(recounting testimony of Stobie affirming that he was police informer for Special
Branch).
57. See Moloney, supra note 13, at 1 (explaining that Stobie was told to provide
guns by his UDA commander for an operation involving a high ranking PIRA mem-
ber). One version of William Stobie's activities as an informant for the Special Branch
comes from an article published by Ed Moloney in THE SUNDAY TRIBUNE (UK). BEYOND
COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 31. However, there has been some dispute as to details
Moloney presented in the article. BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, chs. 3, 5 (providing
further discussion of controversies surrounding Stobie's role in murder of Patrick Finu-
cane). Presented here is Moloney's discussion of Stobie's role in the Finucane murder.
Moloney received his information regarding Stobie's role in the Finucane murder
through a series of interviews he conducted with Stobie beginning in 1990. Moloney,
supra note 13, at 1. Moloney conducted these interviews on the condition that Moloney
would not publish the narrative until Stobie had granted him permission. Id. Stobie
told Moloney of his involvement in Finucane's killing so that he could release the story
publicly in the event he feared his life to be in danger. Id. The article was published on
June 17, 1999. Id. Stobie was murdered on December 12, 2001 in a shooting claimed
by the Red Hand Defenders, a cover name of the UDA. BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note
5, at 52.
58. See Moloney, supra note 13, at 1 (explaining that Stobie called his Special
Branch handlers after learning about planned UDA killing, and provided Special
Branch with all details he knew).
59. See id. (noting that Stobie believes he gave enough information to Special
Branch about upcoming UDA killing that Special Branch could have put UDA com-
mander and potential hit men under surveillance, and possibly prevented UDA opera-
tion from proceeding).
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he was responsible for supplying the weapons the UDA used to
murder Finucane, and that, after the murder took place, Stobie
recovered the weapons the UDA had used carry out the killing.6"
Stobie asserted that he made the Special Branch aware of both
his activities and the movement of Finucane's murder weapon.6 1
According to Stobie, though, the Special Branch chose not, to
attach a bugging device to the guns, or monitor the weapons'
movements, as would have been protocol in typical surveillance
operations.62
Commentators also allege that errant agents in the British
60. See id. (discussing that Stobie delivered guns to UDA on day of Finucane's
killing and retrieved guns after murder to store in "safe house"). The primary responsi-
bilities of a UDA quartermaster include supplying weapons for all UDA missions under
his or her control. BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 30. Martin Ingram, an FRU
whistleblower, has noted that a double agent working as a quartermaster holds a very
important role, because security forces can electronically tag weapons under his or her
control, in order to track their movement. Id. at 41.
61. See Moloney, supra note 13, at 1 (explaining that Stobie informed his Special
Branch handlers about movement of guns throughout entire UDA operation to kill
Finucane).
62. See id. (noting that Stobie claims Special Branch made no attempt to monitor
movement of weapons used in Finucane's murder, contrary to procedures employed in
many Special Branch IRA operations). Martin Ingram stated that he could not contem-
plate a scenario in which the Special Branch would have failed to immediately tag any
weapon that came under his control, and suggested that any failure to do so warrants a
thorough investigation. BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 41-42.
In 1989, Stobie was arrested for gun possession of weapons he claims were planted
by the Special Branch. See Moloney, supra note 13, at 1 (reporting that Stobie claims
gun was planted in order to silence him over role of Special Branch in Finucane kill-
ing). In the course of his 1990 trial for this charge, Stobie allegedly threatened to
reveal that the Special Branch had enough information to prevent Finucane's murder.
See id. (explaining that Stobie claims to have informed his lawyers during trial to inform
Director of Public Prosecutions ("DPP") that Stobie would reveal role of Special Branch
in murder of Finucane). Immediately after this threat, a RUC Detective testifying in the
trial disclosed, while on the stand, that Stobie had a prior record. See id. (noting that
immediately after Stobie claims to have made threat to Special Branch regarding going
public information relating to Special Branch role in Finucane killing, police officer in
witness box presented prejudicial evidence at trial). This action resulted in a mistrial.
See id. When the trial finally went forward on January 31, 1991, the Director of Public
Prosecutions ("DPP") offered no evidence against Stobie and Stobie was inevitably
found not guilty. Id. One commentator noted that such an obvious mistake arouses
suspicion that the government was merely taking steps to ensure that Stobie would not
reveal information about the Finucane murder. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at
33 (noting that commentators believe mistake made by testifying detective at Stobie
trial was so obvious that it appears government was actually attempting to prevent
Stobie from releasing what he knew of Finucane murder). When a new trial was sched-
uled, the prosecution recommended a not guilty verdict, Which commentators note is
highly unusual in this type of case. See id. at 33-34 (contenting that prosecution's rec-
ommendation of not guilty verdict in favor of Stobie was highly out of ordinary, given
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fact that, in Northern Ireland, when weapons are found on defendant's property, bur-
den of proof shifts to defendant).
In 1999, Stobie was arrested and charged with the murder of Patrick Finucane. See
id. at 48 (stating that Stobie's lawyer suggested at arraignment that RUC and DPP had
possessed information on which charge was based for some time); see also IN RE THE
MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 10, para. 5(b) (noting that publication of
Moloney's article directly led to initiation of civil proceedings against Stobie); Mullin,
supra note 5, at 5 (discussing controversy over nine-year time period between Stobie
confession to involvement in Finucane murder and charges brought against him). In
August 2000, the charge of murder against Stobie was commuted from murder to aid-
ing and abetting. BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 50. However, the DPP offered
no evidence against Stobie and the judge entered a formal verdict of not guilty. See id.
at 50-51 (contending that British government used Stobie trial as mechanism for delay-
ing public inquiry into Finucane murder); see also John Murray Brown, Inquiry Call as
Finucane Murder Trial Collapses, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 27, 2001, at 2 (discussing
collapse of Stobie's trial after main prosecution witness, Neil Mulholland, was unable to
be called after health warnings from his psychiatrist); David McKittrick, New Calls for
Inquiry as Finucane Trial Collapses, INDEPENDENT (UK), Nov. 27, 2001, at 18 (reporting
calls for independent inquiry by Finucane family, nationalist political parties, Sinn Fein
and SDLP, and Stobie after collapse of case against Stobie).
After the case against Stobie was ended, Stobie went public to call for an indepen-
dent inquiry into the murder of Patrick Finucane. BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at
51. Not long after Stobie began this public appeal, he was murdered in front of his
home in an attack claimed by the Red Hand Defenders, a cover name of the UDA. Id.
at 52. Commentators have suggested that the lack of police protection afforded Stobie,
coupled with an interest in preventing a full public inquiry into Finucane's murder
lends suspicion to the role of the RUC in Stobie's murder. Id. at 53; see Loyalist Group
Killed Ex-Informer in Belfast, GUARDIAN (UK), -Dec. 21, 2001, at 3 (quoting Finucane's
family as saying that had Stobie been granted anonymity by the police he could still be
alive). See generally David Sharrock, Loyalist Killers Silence Informer, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(UK), Dec. 13, 2001, at 8 (reporting that Red Hand Defenders claim to have killed
Stobie for "crimes against the loyalist community").
In May 2001, a confidential report was uncovered, commonly referred to as the
Walker Report. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 56 (discussing that Ulster Tele-
vision ("UTV") revealed existence of Walker report); see also Insight: Policing the Police,
supra note 14 (discussing effect of Walker Report in establishing primacy of Special
Branch within RUC); Norton-Taylor, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that report was drawn
up by Patrick Walker, senior MI5 officer in Northern Ireland and later head of agency).
Walker Report: Interchange of Intelligence Between Special Branch and CID, Feb. 23, 1981,
available at http://www.serve.com/pfc/policing/walkerl.html [hereinafter Walker Re-
port]. This Report governs the exchange of intelligence between the Special Branch
and the RUC's Criminal Investigations Division ("CID"). See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra
note 5, at 56 (explaining purpose of Walker Report); see also Insight: Policing the Police,
supra note 14 (quoting Chief Superintendent in RUC as mandating that running of
informants, arrests, raid operations, and surveillance require prior Special Branch ap-
proval); Walker Report, supra (stating that Walker Report was commissioned by Chief
Constable on interchange of intelligence information between Special Branch and
CID). See generally Insight: Policing the Police, supra note 14 (providing examples of Spe-
cial Branch halting investigations carried out by CID officers). The Report emphasizes
the primacy of the Special Branch over investigations pursued by the CID. See BEYOND
COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 56 (explaining focus of Walker Report); see also Insight:
Policing the Police, supra note 14 (discussing Special Branch primacy as out of control
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system without clearly defined accountability). The system is shielded behind princi-
ples of national security. Id.; see Norton-Taylor & Hopkins, supra note 14, at 11 (stating
that Special Branch primacy allowed RUC to give precedence to recruitment of terror-
ist informers rather than solving crime). See generally Walker Report, supra (discussing
standards by which Special Branch has primacy over CID). According to the Report, a
CID investigation may be pre-empted if it in any way puts a Special Branch agent at risk.
Id. para. 4. The Walker Report states:
CID Officers must be alert to the possibility of recruiting as agents the individ-
uals whom they are interviewing. When the opportunity to recruit such a per-
son arises, Special Branch must be involved at an early stage both in de-brief-
ing and handling the agent. It is also important to ensure that information
provided by the person so recruited is handled in such a way that his value as
an agent is not put at risk at an early stage.
Id. CID officers are required to be cognizant of the potential of recruiting individuals
they are interviewing as agents. See Walker Report, supra, para. 4 (emphasizing that CID
officers try to recruit agents from interviewees). Additionally, if officers intend to
charge someone who may have intelligence information potentially useful to the Spe-
cial Branch, the CID must arrange for a "reasonable period" between the charge and
court appearance so that the Special Branch may investigate the person in question. Id.
para. 4(2)(c). The Walker Report provides:
When a person in custody has made an admission or admissions to CID and
the CID Officer feels that that person may have intelligence of value it is desir-
able that Special Branch be given an opportunity to question such person. In
those circumstances CID, on completion of questioning, should prefer
charges and, where possible, arrange the Court in such a way that a reasonable
period will elapse between charging and appearance in Court to enable Spe-
cial Branch to question the person concerned for intelligence purposes.
Id.; Commentators note that this emphasis on covert policing cultivated a police culture
in which the quest for intelligence trumped concerns about bringing both agents and
potential agents to justice. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, ch. 6 (discussing crea-
tion of RUC culture wherein quest for intelligence gained through informers was
deemed more important than bringing agents and potential agents to justice); see also
Insight: Policing the Police, supra note 14 (explaining that RUC Special Branch officers
tampered with evidence in order to prevent information on covert agents from coming
to light); Norton-Taylor & Hopkins, supra note 14, at 11 (reporting that UK intelligence
service, M15, gave RUC Special Branch powers allowing force to give priority to recruit-
ing terrorist informers over solving crime). See generally BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note
5 (providing extensive overview of allegations of UK security force collusion and cover-
up of murder of Patrick Finucane).
In the fall of 2000, former CID officer, Johnston Brown, came forward with claims
that the RUC Special Branch had blocked attempts by himself and other RUC officers
to prosecute one of the gunmen in Finucane's murder. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra
note 5, at 56 (discussing claims that Special Branch blocked RUC investigation into
alleged perpetrators of Finucane murder); see also Norton-Taylor & Hopkins, supra note
14, at 11 (noting that Brown first discussed blocked attempts at follow up on confession
of Finucane killer on UTV Insight program); Insight: Policing the Police, supra note 14
(reporting that, after Brown elicited inadmissible confession from Finucane murderer,
he was not allowed to proceed with investigation after Special Branch stepped in);
Clarke, supra note 52, at 18 (reporting that tape recorded confession of Finucane killer
is missing from RUC and has renewed calls for full public inquiry into Finucane mur-
der). See generally Insight: Policing the Police, supra note 14 (providing account by Brown
alleging Special Branch hampered operations, prevented release of information that
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army facilitated Finucane's murder.63 During the time of Finu-
cane's murder, a man named Brian Nelson worked as an under-
cover agent for an elite segment of the British Army, the Force
Research Unit ("FRU"),64 hired to infiltrate the UDA as an in-
could have solved crimes and prevented certain investigations from proceeding). In
the course of one of Brown's investigations, he encountered a man who confessed with
precise detail to the murder of Patrick Finucane, a confession that matched key details
that had not been publicly released. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 58 (ex-
plaining that Brown checked details of confession with details in Finucane murder files
and found them to match up); see also Clarke, supra note 52, at 5 (noting that Ken
Barrett, man who confessed to killing Finucane as Finucane was holding fork in hand,
revealing information not in public domain at time of confession); Insight: Policing the
Police, supra note 14 (reporting that Barrett confessed to Finucane's murder after Bar-
rett requested meeting); Dee, supra note 9, at 18 (explaining that Brown claims Special
Branch blocked his attempt to gain admissible confession, citing value of Barrett as
informant); RUC Held Back Finucane Murder Confession to Protect Informants, SUNDAY TIMES
(UK), Oct. 15, 2000 (reporting that Special Branch halted Brown's investigation in or-
der to protect key informants). However, Brown claims that the Special Branch
stepped in and recruited the man as an informer, choosing not to prosecute him. See
BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 59 (noting that Special Branch had tipped off
Barrett about Brown's desire to prosecute him); see also Dee, supra note 9, at 18 (report-
ing that Brown believed Special Branch to be colluding with paramilitaries to kill him,
in light of information he divulged); Norton-Taylor & Hopkins, supra note 14, at 11
(discussing Brown's allegation that Special Branch officers tampered with evidence re-
lating to Finucane investigation and deliberately misled inquiry into Finucane murder).
63. See Finucane, supra note 1, at 19 .(maintaining that FRU played role in murder
of his father, Patrick); see also Hopkins, supra note 12, at 2 (alleging that FRU colluded
with UDA in murder of Finucane); BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 26 (noting that
suspicions of Nelson's involvement in Finucane murder began as early as 1990 and
urging independent inquiry into murder of Finucane in light of evidence of Nelson's
involvement); see also Hopkins, supra note 12, at 2 (reporting that one of Nelson's FRU
handlers believed Nelson to have perpetrated illegal acts at FRU's request); DAVIES,
supra note 2, at 155-69 (alleging Nelson provided information to UDA in order to facili-
tate Finucane murder); OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that Nelson
alleged that he had directly assisted in targeting Finucane); Deadly Intelligence, supra
note 27 (advocating independent public inquiry based on evidence of Nelson's active
involvement in Finucane murder); Neil Mackay, The Secret Wars of a Spymaster, SUNDAY
HERALD (UK), Nov. 26, 2000, at 11 (noting that FRU was involved in 15 murders as
result of FRU collusion with loyalist groups). See generally DAVIES, supra note 2, at 155-69
(providing narrative of FRU's Brian Nelson in facilitating murder of Finucane); Brits:
Dark Side of War, supra note 12 (detailing alleged role of FRU officer Brian Nelson in
murder of Finucane and others).
64. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing creation of FRU in re-
sponse to Troubles); see also Hopkins, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that FRU was created
in 1980). The goal of the FRU was to target, recruit, and maintain human sources from
all divisions of the community, but primarily within both republican and loyalist
paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. See LEWIS, supra note 12, at xv (defin-
ing purpose of FRU); see also DAVIES, supra note 2, at 41 (providing description of FRU
objectives); Hopkins, supra note 12, at 2 (explaining that FRU recruited and main-
tained agents in various paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland). FRU officers
working as informers were generally assigned to different FRU officers who worked as
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former.6 5 Nelson worked for a number of years as the UDA's
senior intelligence officer, and regularly received information
from his FRU handlers that allowed the UDA to better target its
Catholic victims.66 Commentators allege that in 1989 Brian Nel-
son used intelligence, provided by the FRU, to better target the
UDA's next planned victim, Patrick Finucane.67 Commentators
note that in providing the UDA with certain key details about
Finucane, 6 received from the FRU, both Nelson and his FRU
handlers, debriefing and counseling the covert agents throughout their operations. See
BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 23 (characterizing interactions between FRU covert
agents and their FRU handlers); ColonelJ Statement During Trial of Brian Nelson, Jan. 29,
1992, available at http://www.serve.com/pfc/reginaVnelson/ntboalcol.html [hereinaf-
ter ColonelJ Transcript] (noting that, according to head of FRU, no guidelines existed
for undercover agents' activities).
65. See OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 3 (noting time period when Brian
Nelson worked for both UDA and FRU); see also BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 24
(noting that Nelson joined UDA in 1972, and, in 1983, offered to help British army
intelligence); Hopkins, supra note 12, at 2 (reporting that by time of Finucane's death,
Nelson held position as UDA's senior intelligence officer). See generally DAVIES, supra
note 2 (providing account of Brian Nelson's career in FRU).
66. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 25 (noting that FRU purchased com-
puter for Nelson in order to share intelligence information more easily); see also Jim
Cusack, Speculation FRU May Have Been Involved: The Theft of Files from Special Branch
Offices in Belfast Could have Far Reaching Consequences for the North's Intelligence Agencies and
Paramilitary Informants, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at 6 (reporting that FRU provided
information to Brian Nelson on republican individuals); Finucane, supra note 1, at 19
(reporting that Nelson admitted to receiving British army documents and photographs
in order to assist UDA in targeting killings); Brits: Dark Side of War, supra note 12 (re-
porting that Nelson sometimes did not pass on certain information to FRU about
planned killings). See generally, DAVIES, supra note 2 (providing overview of Nelson's
intelligence activities within FRU and UDA).
67. See DAVIES, supra note 2, at 161 (noting that Nelson obtained Finucane's ad-
dress from FRU in order to provide it to UDA); see also BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note
5, at 26 (recounting Nelson's statement that he provided photograph of Finucane to
UDA assassin on Thursday before killing); John Ware, Time to Come Clean over the Army's
Role in the Dirty War', NEW STATESMAN, Apr. 16, 1998, at 16 (alleging that Nelson failed
to prevent Finucane murder due either to failure to inform FRU handlers or FRU fail-
ure to pass on information to RUC);JusTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, para. 1.2 (alleging
that Nelson summarized information about Finucane on card, referred by UDA as "I"
(personality) card, in order to better target Finucane for potential attack).
68. See Ware, supra note 67, at 16 (alleging that Nelson provided UDA with photo-
graph of Finucane before Finucane's murder was carried out); see also DAVIES, supra
note 2, at 161-62 (claiming that FRU provided Nelson with Finucane's home address,
which was passed onto UDA); Finucane, supra note 1, at 19 (contending that FRU pro-
vided Nelson with detailed intelligence information in order to assist Nelson in better
targeting intended UDA victims); Mullin, supra note 5, at 5 (asserting that Nelson pro-
vided UDA details about Finucane and Finucane's daily movements three weeks before
Finucane's killing);JuSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, para. 1.2 (alleging that Nelson used
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handlers, assisted in the murder of Finucane.69 Brian Nelson
has never faced charges in the murder of Patrick Finucane.7 °
B. Regional Human Rights Obligations
Traditionally, there was no formal legal framework regulat-
ing the use of informers in the UK.71 Experts explain that the
use of informers was an accepted practice and enjoyed unlimited
discretion at the hands of law enforcement.72 Informer regula-
detailed intelligence provided to him by FRU in order to facilitate murder of Finu-
cane).
69. See JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, para. 1.2 (alleging that Nelson was actively
involved in Finucane murder); OFFICIAL COLLUSION, supra note 1, at 2 (alleging Nel-
son's involvement in Finucane murder constitutes government collusion); BEYOND COL-
LUSION, supra note 5, at 29-30 (urging public inquiry into Finucane murder, to explore
whether Nelson targeted Finucane and what information Nelson passed onto FRU han-
dlers); Finucane, supra note 1, at 19 (alleging Nelson's involvement in Finucane mur-
der and FRU cover-up of evidence relating to investigation); Jim Dwyer, When Brit Gov't
OKD Killing, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 31, 1998, at 8 (reporting that Nelson helped plan killing
of Finucane).
70. See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 29 (explaining that Nelson was in-
formed by British government that he would not face charges stemming from his role
in Finucane murder); see also Hopkins, supra note 12, at 2 (reporting that investigation
team assured Nelson he would.not be prosecuted for Finucane murder). Controversy
has also arisen over alleged destruction of evidence in relation to Finucane's murder.
See BEYOND COLLUSION, supra note 5, at 28 (discussing suspicious circumstances sur-
rounding destruction of evidence in Stevens investigation of Finucane murder). After
FRU documents were turned over to officials investigating Finucane's murder, a fire
broke out under highly suspicious circumstances in the office holding the documents,
burning everything stored there. Id. In 1989, the RUC recovered the pistol used to
murder Patrick Finucane. Id. at 32. However, instead of remaining in the custody of
the forensic laboratory, the gun was unusually transferred to the British Army. Id.
News articles have reported that the Army replaced both the barrel and slide of the
gun, the two gun parts that leave evidentiary marks on the slug and shell of bullets. Id.
See generally JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, para. 9 (discussing alleged suppression of
information regarding Finucane murder).
71. See Neyroud & Beckley, supra note 15, at 164 (explaining that no legal frame-
work existed prior to RIPA governing use of informers); see also Gillespie, supra note 15
(noting that no statutory framework regarding authorization of informers existed prior
to RIPA's enactment); Madeleine Colvin, A Legal Basis for Covert Policing, 148 NEW L.J.
1133 (1998) (noting, in 1998, that both informers and undercover operations were
governed solely by internal administrative guidelines); ColonelJ Transcript, supra note 64
(noting that FRU possessed no guidelines for handling undercover agent activities).
72. See Gillespie, supra note 15 (explaining that use of informers was accepted
practice and was not subject to outside scrutiny); see also Colvin, supra note 71, at 1133
(contending that use of informers prior to RIPA was unaccountable to independent,
outside sources of scrutiny and failed to provide remedies for wrongful breaches of
privacy stemming from use of informers); Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission,
New Developments in Human Rights and Policing, Address Delivered at the Garda Siochana
Conference, (Nov. 3-4, 2000), available at http://www.nihrc.org/files/speechl7a.htm
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tion was primarily drawn from Home Office circulars and
through internal guidance. 73 Experts note that under this sys-
tem, if, for example, an informer violated an individual's right to
privacy, there were no statutory instruments in existence to ad-
dress the wrong. 4 Experts also observe that judicial safeguards
involving the use of informers, such as the substantive defense of
entrapment, do not exist in the UK.75 Prior to RIPA's enact-
ment, the controlling non-statutory authority regarding the use
[hereinafter Garda Siochana Conference] (noting that RIPA attempts to regulate activities
previously within sole police discretion). See generally Neyroud & Beckley, supra note 15,
at 164-65 (discussing evolution of push for statutory guidelines governing use of inform-
ers).
73. See Neyroud & Beckley, supra note 15, at 165 (describing informal, internal
methods governing use of informers prior to RIPA's enactment); see also Colvin, supra
note 71, at 1133 (explaining that prior to RIPA's enactment, informers in UK were
subject to internal, administrative guidelines only), At least one commentator has sug-
gested that with or without a legal framework, certain tests must be satisfied so that they
do not infringe on an individual's right to privacy. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 71, at
1133. She believes that the interference must be shown to be both necessary and pro-
portional. See id. Additionally, she suggests that other, less intrusive methods must ei-
ther have failed or been unable to work. See id. Colvin also notes that there needs to be
an independent and accountable system which can authorize and monitor the use of
intrusive surveillance and can provide remedies for individuals whose rights have been
breached. See id. Colvin contends that these principles were unable to be satisfied
under a system regulated principally through internal administrative guidelines. See id.
74. See Colvin, supra note 71 (explaining that before RIPA was enacted, no mecha-
nisms were in place to remedy breaches of rights under European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention"));
see also Gillespie, supra note 15 (noting that before RIPA's enactment, breaches of Arti-
cle 8(1) of European Convention, protecting right to privacy, were without statutory
remedy).
75. See Stephen Uglow, The Human Rights Act 1998: Part 4: Covert Surveillance and
the European Convention on Human Rights, CRIM. L.R. 287, 290 (1999) (noting that, ac-
cording to UK law, there is no substantive defense of entrapment). But see Police and
Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 78 (Eng.) [hereinafter PACE] (holding that trial
court may exclude evidence obtained by undercover agent where evidence would detri-
mentally affect fairness of proceedings).
Section 78 of the PACE provides:
1. In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that,
having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in
which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have
such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court
ought not to admit it.
2. Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to
exclude evidence.
3. This section shall not apply in the case of proceedings before a magistrates'
court inquiring into offences as examining justices.
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of informers came from decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights ("European Court"), a judicial enforcement
mechanism created under the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("Eu-
ropean Convention").76
1. The European Convention
The United Kingdom ("UK") signed the European Conven-
tion in 1950.77 The European Convention, a regional human
rights treaty, functions to establish and enforce human rights
norms within signatory nations.78 The European Convention
provides that all signatories to the treaty subject themselves to its
jurisdiction, implicitly agreeing to enforce the rights and free-
doms protected under the European Convention.v9 Protected
rights under the European Convention include the right to pri-
vacy8° and the right to an effective remedy.81
76. European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, art: 19 [hereinafter European Convention].
Article 19 states: "To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the
High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be
set up a European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as 'the Court.' It
shall function on a permanent basis." Id.
77. See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Treaty Open for Signature by the Member States, available at http://conven
tions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm (noting date UK signed European
Convention).
78. See HUMAN RIGHTS 551-52 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS] (explaining that European Convention provides international remedy for vio-
lations of European Convention rights, in situations where domestic remedy is inade-
quate); see also Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights: A Critique, in HUMAN RiGHTS IN
GLOBAL POLITICS 114 (Tim Dunne & NicholasJ. Wheeler eds., 1999) (discussing Euro-
pean Convention's effectiveness in comparison to other international human rights leg-
islation); HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 808 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing effectiveness of European
Court of Human Rights in enforcing human rights norms within Europe).
79. European Convention, supra note 76, art. 1. Article 1 of the European Con-
vention provides that, "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention." Id.
80. Id. art. 8. Article 8 of the European Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
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As a signatory to the European Convention, the UK ac-
knowledged the rights protected under the European Conven-
tion, even without a domestic statutory basis for its enforce-
ment.8 2 Commentators note, therefore, that though the incor-
poration of the European Convention into UK domestic law did
not' occur until the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998,83 the
UK could still be held in violation of European Convention stan-
dards, even without its own domestic enforcement mechanism.84
2. The European Court of Human Rights
The European Convention provides that the primary means
of interpreting European Convention rights lay within decisions
of the European Court.8 5 In reviewing cases of covert surveil-
lance, European Court decisions have focused on potential
threats to both the right to privacy and the right to an effective
Id.
81. Id. art. 13. Article 13 of the European Convention provides:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as Set forth in this Convention are vio-
lated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstand-
ing that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official ca-
pacity.
Id.
82. See Steiner & Alston, supra note 78, at 797 (stating that primary responsibility
for implementation of European Convention lies with member States); see also HuMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 552 (stating that European system is designed to ensure effec-
tive protection of Convention rights through national law and procedures, while provid-
ing international remedy in circumstances where internal law falls short).
83. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
84. European Convention, supra note 76, art. 19. Article 19 of the European Con-
vention provides:
To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Con-
tracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set
up a European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as 'the Court.'
It shall function on a permanent basis.
Id.; see also Uglow, supra note 75, at 297 (noting that system of covert surveillance prior
to passage of Human Rights Act in likely violation of Convention); see also Garda Si-
ochana Conference, supra note 72 (discussing that RIPA passed partly as response to UK
losing case in European Court of Human Rights).
85. European Convention, supra note 76, art. 32. Article 32 of the European Con-
vention provides:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto
which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34 and 47.
2. In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court
shall decide.
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remedy.86 Through a series of decisions, the European Court
established standards and guidelines regarding the use of covert
surveillance, aimed at protecting each of these rights.87
a. The Right to Privacy
Article 8 of the European Convention protects the individ-
ual's right to privacy.88 The European Court has provided a
number of standards aimed at protecting Article 8's guarantees
during the course of covert surveillance operations.8 9 European
Court opinions have held that a system of positive laws must be
instituted, providing statutory guidelines for a covert surveillance
authorization. t Those guidelines must be reasonably clear in
their language as to both the circumstances and conditions
86. See, e.g., Halford v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 523 (1997), paras. 44-
70 (taking into account whether violations of either Article 8 or Article 13 occurred in
instance of covert wiretapping); Malone v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14
(1985), paras. 63-91 (determining whether violations of Article 8 or Article 13 occurred
in covert surveillance case); Kruslin v. France, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 (1990), paras. 26-
35 (considering whether violation of Article 8 occurred in relation to practice of covert
surveillance).
87. See, e.g., Kopp v. Switzerland, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91 (1999), para. 64 (holding
that domestic law governing use of covert surveillance must be clearly written so as to
provide citizens indications of when and how covert surveillance may be used); Smith
and Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (2000), para. 135 (explaining that
national authorities must provide for substantive review of European Convention viola-
tions to meet requirements of Article 13); see also JUSTICE, REGULATION OF INVESTIGA-
TORY POWERS BILL: PART II: SURVEILLANCE AND COVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES:
HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE STAGE, Mar. 2000, at 2.4, available at http://
www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/pow.PDF [hereinafter JUSTICE II] (noting that be-
cause covert surveillance has potential for intrusion, it must be regulated in order to
comply with Article 8 of European Convention). See generally Madeleine Colvin, Covert
Policing and the Convention, 147 NEW LJ. 1821 (1997) (providing overview of relation of
European Convention rights to issues raised in covert policing).
88. See European Convention, supra note 76, art. 8.
89. See, e.g., Halford, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 49 (indicating that laws governing
covert surveillance must be lucid enough in their language so as to allow individuals to
anticipate when such measures may be used); Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 55 (ex-
plaining that in European Court, substance of law regulating use of covert surveillance
is important factor in determining whether Article 8 violation exists); Kruslin, 12 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at paras. 33-34 (holding that system of "piecemeal" judgments regulating use
of covert surveillance is insufficient system of governance for Article 8 purposes).
90. See Kruslin, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 36 (holding that clear laws governing use
of covert surveillance must be installed in order to protect guarantees of Article 8); see
also Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at paras. 71-72 (indicating that rules covering covert surveil-
lance must be both clear and comprehensive); Malone, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 68
(stating that authorities must create laws regarding use of covert surveillance that are
sufficiently clear and have legitimate aims so as to prevent Article 8 violations).
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upon which an authorization may be issued.91 Statements of
general principles and guidelines or piecemeal statements are
not sufficient under the European Court's standards. 2
The European Court has suggested a number of times that
safeguards must be installed in order to guard against systemic
abuse." In both Kopp v. Switzerland and Klass v. Germany, the
European Court emphasized the desirability of independent ju-
dicial control over the covert surveillance authorization process
for this particular purpose.94 In Kopp, the European Court
harshly criticized the practice of internal, executive authoriza-
tion of covert surveillance operations in Switzerland, without
overview of an independent judge.95 In Klass, the European
Court stressed that independent judicial supervision of covert
surveillance is advantageous, given the effects of potential abuse
on both the individual and society.96
b. Right to an Effective Remedy
Article 13 of the European Convention requires that domes-
tic authorities provide an "effective remedy" against all violations
of European Convention rights.97 The European Court has held
domestic human rights remedies to be inadequate where the
substance of an individual's European Convention claim is not
considered.9" Judicial review proceedings, insofar as they pre-
91. See Malone, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 79 (holding that domestic law regulating
use of covert surveillance must be lucid enough in its language in order to allow citizens
to be aware of how and when such surveillance may occur).
92. See Kruslin, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 34 (holding that "piecemeal"judgments
comprising system of covert surveillance governance in France was insufficient in meet-
ing requirements of Article 8).
93. See, e.g., id. at para. 35 (indicating that system of safeguards against possible
Article 8 abuses is factor in deciding whether such violation occurred); Kopp, 27 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at para. 4 (suggesting that supervision of independent judge may be ade-
quate safeguard against possible Article 8 abuses).
94. See Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 4 (emphasizing that safeguards, such as
review by independent judge, are important in protecting domestic covert surveillance
systems from abuse); see also Klass v. Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 (1979-80), para. 3
(considering that, given potential for abuse in covert surveillance authorization system,
independent review by impartial judge is recommended).
95. See Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 4 (suggesting that use of independent
judge is good method of preventing abuses of covert surveillance system).
96. See Klass, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 3 (stating that employment of independent
judiciary body for overview purposes may help guarantee Article 8 protection on do-
mestic front).
97. See European Convention, supra note 76, art. 13.
98. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997), para. 7
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vent such a substantive assessment, have been deemed inade-
quate by the European Court.99
In Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, the European Court
considered the judicial review of an Article 8 claim by an admin-
istrative body in the United Kingdom.100 It found judicial review
to be inadequate in that the standards applied in assessing the
Article 8 claim prevented a substantive analysis of the basic Arti-
cle 8 principles.01 Judicial review has similarly been found to be
inadequate in cases involving Article 3102 and Article 6 com-
plaints.1 °3
3. The Human Rights Act 1998: Incorporating the European
Convention into Domestic Law
The Human Rights Act, which came into force in October
2000, incorporates the European Convention into British do-
mestic law.104 As a result of this incorporation, British citizens
(holding that judicial review of UK asylum proceeding was inadequate in. that it was
unable to provide substantive review of potential Article 3 violation, due to importance
Court places on Article 3 violations and irreparable harm which may have been
caused); Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (2000), para. 5
(holding that judicial review of Article 8 claim insufficient because it prevented a
proper substantive review of important Article 8 principles). But see Vilvarajah and
Others v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 248 (1992), para. 2 (holding thatjudicial
review procedures employed in reviewing asylum procedures in UK were sufficient be-
cause of degree of scrutiny employed in lower courts).
99. See, e.g., Chahal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 7 (finding violation of Article 13,
given inability ofjudicial review to provide substantive assessment of potential Article 3
violation); Smith and Grady, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 5 (finding violation of Article 13,
where judicial review proceedings were unable to assess merits of potential Article 8
violation).
100. See Smith and Grady, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at paras. 1143 (reviewing decision by
British Royal Navy administrative body to discharge individuals based on grounds of
homosexuality).
101. See id. para. 5 (holding violation of Article 13 based on inability of judicial
review to reach substance of Article 8 claim).
102. See, e.g., Chahal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 7 (holding violation of Article 13
because of inability of judicial review to reach substance of Article 3 claim).
103. See Tinnelly & Sons Lts. & Others and McElduff & Others v. United Kingdom,
27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 249 (1999), paras. 1-3 (holding that inability of judicial review to
evaluate substance of Article 6 claim was violation of Article 13).
104. See Kevin Dooley Kent, Basic Rights and Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Can Britain's
CriminalJustice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 be Reconciled with its Human Rights Act?,
33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 221, 230 (2000) (noting date when Human Rights Act takes
legal effect in UK). The introduction to the Human Rights Act states that it is "an Act to
give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention
on Human Rights; to make provision with respect to holders of certain judicial offices
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may now enforce European Convention rights in the British do-
mestic legal system.10 5 In order to bring suit for the breach of a
right under the European Convention, the breach must have
been caused by a public authority.106 Prior to the passage of the
who become judges of the European Court of Human Rights; and for connected pur-
poses." Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 3, intro. (Eng.).
105. See Kent, supra note 104, at 230 (explaining that after incorporation of
Human Rights Act, British citizens may enforce European Convention rights in both
European Court and in UK domestic legal system). Section 3(1) of the Human Rights
Act states that: "So far as it is possible, primary legislation and subordinate legislation
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights."
Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 3, para. 1 (Eng.).
106. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 7 (Eng.). The Human Rights Act states in
section 7:
(1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act)
in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may:
(a) bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appro-
priate court or tribunal, or
(b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal pro-
ceedings, but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act.
(2) In subsection (1) (a) "appropriate court or tribunal" means such court or
tribunal as may be determined in accordance with rules; and proceedings
against an authority include a counterclaim or similar proceeding.
(3) If the proceedings are brought on an application for judicial review, the
applicant is to be taken to have a sufficient interest in relation to the un-
lawful act only if he is, or would be, a victim of that act.
(4) If the proceedings are made by way of a petition for judicial review in
Scotland, the applicant shall be taken to have title and interest to sue in
relation to the unlawful act only if he is, or would be, a victim of that act.
(5) Proceedings under subsection (1) (a) must be brought before the end
of-
(a) the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act com-
plained of took place; or
(b) such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable hav-
ing regard to all the circumstances, but that is subject to any rule
imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in ques-
tion.
(6) In subsection (1) (b) "legal proceedings" includes-
(a) proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a public authority;
and
(b) an appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal.
(7) For the purposes of this section, a person is a victim of an unlawful act
only if he would be a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the Conven-
tion if proceedings were brought in the European Court of Human Rights
in respect of that act.
(8) Nothing in this Act creates a criminal offence.
(9) In this section "rules" means-
(a) in relation to proceedings before a court or tribunal outside Scotland,
rules made by the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State for the
purposes of this section or rules of court,
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Human Rights Act, British citizens were able to seek redress
from the European Court for a violation of a European Conven-
tion right. °7 In order to have standing in the European Court, a
complainant had to have exhausted all domestic remedies.'0 8
However, following the implementation of the Human Rights
Act, British citizens can now enforce these rights in both the Eu-
ropean Court and in the British domestic legal system. °9
II. RIPA: Regulating Covert Informers
After passage of the Human Rights Act, and in light of the
European Court holdings described earlier, the UK came under
(b) in relation to proceedings before a court or tribunal in Scotland,
rules made by the Secretary of State for those purposes,
(c) in relation to proceedings before a tribunal in Northern Ireland-
(i) which deals with transferred matters; and
(ii) for which no rules made under paragraph (a) are in force, rules
made by a Northern Ireland department for those purposes, and
includes provision made by order under section 1 of the Courts
and Legal Services Act 1990.
(10) In making rules, regard must be had to section 9.
(11) The Minister who has power to make rules in relation to a particular
tribunal may, to the extent he considers it necessary to ensure that the
tribunal can provide an appropriate remedy in relation to an act (or
proposed act) of a public authority which is (or would be) unlawful as a
result of section 6(1), by order add to-
(a) the relief or remedies which the tribunal may grant; or
(b) the grounds on which it may grant any of them.
(12) An order made under subsection (11) may contain such incidental, sup-
plemental, consequential or transitional provision as the Minister mak-
ing it considers appropriate.
(13) "The Minister" includes the Northern Ireland department concerned.
Id.
107. See Kent, supra note 104, at 232 (noting that British citizens had ability to
enforce European Convention rights in European Court prior to passage of Human
Rights Act); see also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 78, at 797 (indicating that all member
States to European Convention may seek redress for violations of Convention rights in
European Court, irrespective of whether European Convention has been incorporated
into particular legal system); HENKIN, supra note 78, at 552 (noting that purpose of
European Convention is to provide international remedies for human rights violations
that have not been properly remedied under domestic legal systems).
108. See European Convention, supra note 76, art. 35(1). The European Conven-
tion states in article 35(1): "This Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of interna-
tional law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision
was taken." Id.
109. See Kent, supra note 104, at 232-33 (explaining that incorporation of Euro-
pean Convention through Human Rights Act allows British citizens to enforce Euro-
pean Convention rights in UK domestic courts).
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increased pressure to create a formal legal instrument governing
the use of informers." ° In 2000, the British government re-
sponded by creating and enacting RIPA."' The stated goal of
RIPA is to ensure that human rights are protected in govern-
mental investigatory pursuits.' 2 RIPA further proclaims the de-
sire to operate in conjunction with existing UK domestic law." 3
RIPA attempts to deal with the use of covert informers in two
ways: it creates statutory guidelines governing the use of covert
informers" 4 and establishes a tribunal to investigate possible
abuses within the covert agent system." 5
A. Authorizing the Use of Informers
RIPA categorizes the use of surveillance into three types of
110. See Neyroud & Beckley, supra note 15, at 163, 173 (stating that UK govern-
ment was forced to enact RIPA to meet requirements of Human Rights Act and to
preempt contentious issues that could arise regarding unregulated covert policing); see
also Gillespie, supra note 15 (discussing that European Court decisions adverse to UK
compelled British government to enact RIPA); Yaman Akdeniz, Regulation oflnvestiga-
tory Powers Act 2000: Part I: BigBrother.gov. uk: State Surveillance in the Age of Information
and Rights, 74 CRim. L. REv. 73, 74 (2001) (stating that RIPA attempts to meet chal-
lenges of regulating State surveillance in information age). In 1998, JUSTICE, a UK
human rights organization, published a study analyzing the existing common law
framework governing the use of informers in light of the UK's human rights obliga-
tions. Neyroud & Beckley, supra note 15, at 168. As a result of this study, JUSTICE
made a number of recommendations to the UK government that would enable it to
function in a more human rights compliant manner. Id. The study concluded that
there should be clearer rules on granting immunity to informers, that there'should be a
primary legislative framework setting out the principles of police use of informers and
that this framework should be supported by detailed Codes that pay greater mind to the
ethical issues in all areas. Id.
111. See Neyroud & Beckley, supra note 15, at 165 (noting that UK passed RIPA to
comply with adverse European Court decisions regarding UK's lack of statutory frame-
work regarding use of informers); see also Akdeniz, supra note 110, at 74 (contending
that RIPA represents attempt by UK government to meet demands of Human Rights
Act); Gillespie, supra note 15 (indicating that RIPA was passed in order to comply with
standards set by European Court regarding authorization of informers).
112. See RIPA Explanatory Notes, supra note 16, para. 5 (stating that RIPA aims to
work with existing legislation, including Human Rights Act, Intelligence Services Act
1994, and Police Services Act 1997).
113. Id. RIPA's Explanatory Notes provide that "The Act will work in conjunction
with existing legislation, in particular the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the Police Act
1997 and the Human Rights Act 1998." Id.
114. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, pt. II (Eng.) (develop-
ing statutory framework governing authorization of informers in UK).
115. See id. pt. IV (creating tribunal to address violations of RIPA provisions).
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activity: directed surveillance,1 16 intrusive surveillance, '1 7 and
the conduct and use of covert human intelligence sources
("CHIS").18 According to RIPA's definition, the use of inform-
ers falls under the CHIS category."1 9 Section 29 of the Act, RIPA
sets out an authorization scheme governing the conduct and use
of CHIS.120
To be authorized by a government agent,1 21 CHIS must be
116. See id., § 26, para. 2. RIPA defines directed surveillance in Part II, Section 26
of the Act, stating:
Surveillance is directed for the purposes of this Part if it is covert but not
intrusive and is undertaken-
(a) for the purposes of a specific investigation or a specific operation
(b) in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private informa-
tion about a person (whether or not one specifically identified for the
purposes of the investigation or operation); and
(c) otherwise than by way of an immediate response to events or circum-
stances the nature of which is such that it would not be reasonably practi-
cable for an authorisation under this Part to be sought for the carrying
out of the surveillance.
Id.
117. See id. para. 3. RIPA defines intrusive surveillance in Part II, Section 26 of the
Act, stating:
Surveillance is intrusive for the purposes of this Part if, and only if, it is covert
surveillance that-
(a) is carried out by means only of a surveillance device designed or adapted
principally for the purpose of providing information about the location of
a vehicle; or
(b) it is surveillance consisting in any such interception of a communication
as falls within section 48(4).
Id.
118. See id. para. 8. RIPA defines covert human intelligence sources in Part II,
Section 26 of the Act, stating:
For the purposes of this Part a person is a covert human intelligence source
if-
(a) he establishes or maintains a personal or other relationship with a person
for the covert purpose of facilitating the doing of anything falling within
paragraph (b) or (c);
(b) he covertly uses such a relationship to obtain information or to provide
access to any information to another person; or
(c) he covertly discloses information obtained by the use of such a relation-
ship, or as a consequence of the existence of such a relationship.
Id.
119. See id. pt. II, § 29.
120. See id.
121. Home Office, Public Consultation on Draft Code of Practice on the Use of
Covert Human Intelligence Sources: The Use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources:
Code of Practice, para. 2.1, available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/covhis.htm
[hereinafter Draft Code of Practice]. Paragraph 2.1 of the Draft Code of Practice states
that "responsibility for authorising the use or conduct of a source rests with the
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shown to be necessary on grounds of: national security; preven-
tion or detection of crime or disorder; the economic well-being
of the United Kingdom; public safety; protection of public
health; evaluation or collection of taxes, duties, levies or other
impositions, contributions or charges payable to a government
department; or for any purpose (other than those previously
listed) that is specified for the purposes of an order made by the
Secretary of State. 22 In addition, RIPA mandates that arrange-
ments exist to safeguard the CHIS activity. 123 Accordingly, there
must be a person who holds the relevant investigative authority
authorising officer. Authorizations require the personal authority of the authorising
officer." Id.
122. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, pt. II, § 29 (1)-(3) (Eng.).
RIPA provides in Section 29, paragraphs 2 and 3 that:
(2) A person shall not grant an authorisation for the conduct or the use of a
covert human intelligence source unless he believes-
(a) that the authorisation is necessary on grounds falling within subsec-
tion (3);
(b) that the authorised conduct or use is proportionate to what is sought
to be achieved by that conduct or use; and
(c) that arrangements exist for the source's case that satisfy the require-
ments of subsection (5) and such other requirements as may be im-
posed by order by the Secretary of State.
(3) An authorisation is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it
is necessary-
(a) in the interest of national security;
(b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing
disorder;
(c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom;
(d) in the interests of public safety
(e) for the purpose of protecting public health
(f) for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other
imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government depart-
ment; or
(g) for any purpose (not falling within paragraphs (a) to (f)) which is
specified for the purposes of this subsection by an order made by the
Secretary of State.
Id. According to RIPA, part II, section 29(6), the Secretary of State must lay a draft of
the order before Parliament and have it approved by a resolution of each House before
enacting an order. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, pt. II,
§ 29(6).
123. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, pt. II, § 29, para. 5
(Eng.). RIPA provides in Part II, Section 29, paragraph 5 the arrangements that are to
be made regarding the maintenance of the surveillance, stating:
(5) For the purposes of this Part there are arrangements for the source's case
that satisfy the requirements of this subsection if such arrangements are in
force as are necessary for ensuring-.
(a) that there will at all times be a person holding an office, rank or posi-
tion with the relevant investigating authority who will have day-to-day
1318 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:1282
responsibility for dealing with the source on behalf of that authority,
and for the source's security and welfare;
(b) that there will at all times be another person holding an office, rank
or position with the relevant investigating authority who will have
general oversight of the use made of the source;
(c) that there will at all times be a person holding an office, rank or posi-
tion with the relevant investigating authority who will have responsi-
bility for maintaining a record of the use made of the source;
(d) that the records relating to the source that are maintained by the
relevant investigating authority will always contain particulars of all
such matters (if any) as may be specified for the purposes of this para-
graph in regulations made by the Secretary of State; and
(e) that records are maintained by the relevant investigating authority
that disclose the identity of the source will not be available to persons
except to the extent that there is a need for access to them to be
made available to those persons.
Id.; see also Draft Codes of Practice, supra note 108, para. 2.35. Paragraph 2.35 of the
Draft Codes of Practice states:
An application for authorisation for the use or conduct of a source should
record:
- details of the purpose for which the source will be tasked or deployed (e.g.
in relation to an organized serious crime, espionage, a series of racially moti-
vated crimes, etc.);
- the grounds on which authorisation is sought (e.g. for the detection of
crime, or the protection of public health);
- where a specific investigation or operation is involved, details of that investi-
gation or operation;
- details of what the source will be tasked to do;
- details of the level of authority required (or recommended, where that is
different);
- details of potential collateral intrusion;
- details of any confidential material that might be obtained as a consequence
of the authorisation
Id. Paragraphs 3.11-3.15 of the Draft Codes of Practice state:
3.11: The records maintained by the public authorities should be maintained
in such a way as to preserve the confidentiality of the source and the
information provided by that source. There should, at all times, be a
designated person within the relevant public authority who will have re-
sponsibility for maintaining a record of the use made of the source.
3.12: The 2000 Act provides that an authorizing officer must not grant an
authorisation for the conduct or use of a source unless he believes that
there are arrangements in place for ensuring that there is at all times a
person with the responsibility for maintaining a record of the use made
of the source.
3.13: The records should contain particulars of:
(a) the identity of the source;
(b) the identity or identities used by the source, where known;
(c), the means used within the authority of referring to the source;
(d) any significant information connected with the security and welfare
of the source;
(e) any confirmation made by a person granting or renewing an
authorisation for the conduct or use of a source that the informa-
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who will have daily responsibilities for dealing with the source
and the source's security and welfare; 124 will have general over-
tion in (d) has been considered and that any identified risks to the
security and welfare of the source have been properly explained to
and understood by the source.
(f) the date when and circumstances in which, the source was recruited;
(g) the relevant investigating authority in relation to the source (other
than the authority that is maintaining the records);
(h) the identities of the persons in the relevant investigating authority
who, in relation to the source, are discharging or have discharged
the responsibilities mentioned in section 29(5)(a) to (c) of the
2000 Act and paragraph 2.28 of this code where relevant;
(i) the period for which those responsibilities have been discharged by
those persons;
(j) the tasks that are given to the source and the demands made of him
in relation to his activities as a source;
(k) all contacts or communications between the source and a person
acting on behalf of the relevant investigating authority;
(1) the information obtained by the relevant investigating authority by
the conduct or use of the source;
(in) the information so obtained which is disseminated by the relevant
investigating authority;
(n) in the case of a source who is not an undercover operative, every
payment, benefit or reward or every offer of a payment, benefit or
reward that is made or provided by or on behalf of the relevant
investigating authority in respect of the source's activites for the
benefit of any such authority.
3.14: In addition, it is recommended that records/copies of the following, as
appropriate, should be kept by the relevant authority:
(a) any authorisation granted and, where relevant, renewed;
(b) any authorization which was granted or renewed orally (in an ur-
gent case) and the reason why the case was considered urgent;
(c) any risk assessment made in relation to the source;
(d) the circumstances in which tasks were given to the source;
(e) the value of the source to the investigating authority;
(f) the reason why the person renewing an authorisation considered it
necessary to do so;
(g) the results of any reviews of the authorisation
(h) the reasons, if any, for not renewing an authorisation
(i) the reasons for cancelling an authorisation.
3.15: In the event that a source is specifically tasked in a way which is intended
or likely to interfere with the ECHR Article 8 rights of any person or
persons not previously considered as coming within the remit of the
original authorisation, or to a degree significantly greater -than previ-
ously identified, the handler or controller must refer to the proposed
tasking to the authorising officer, who should consider whether a sepa-
rate authorisation is required. This should be done in advance of any
tasking and the details of such referrals must be recorded.
Id.
124. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, pt. 1I, § 29, para. 5(a)
(Eng.).
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sight of the use made of the source; 125 and will have responsibil-
ity for maintaining a record of the use of the source.126 RIPA
further maintains that records must be maintained to account
for the particulars of the activity127 and protect the identity of
the source, subject to necessity. 12  Once these conditions are
met, the use of covert human surveillance may be authorized on
an entirely internal basis.' 29 Experts note that there is neither
an obligation nor statutory device by which prior and external
judicial approval may be sought.13 0
Two Commissioners provide broad oversight of the CHIS
authorization process.13 ' The Intelligence Services Commis-
sioner ("ICS") operates outside of Northern Ireland, reviewing
125. See id. para. 5(b).
126. See id. para 5(c).
127. See id. para. 5(d).
128. See id. para. 5(e).
129. See id. pt. II, § 29.
130. See Gillespie, supra note 15 (noting thatjudicial approval is not factor in CHIS
authorizations under RIPA).
131. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, pt. IV, §§'59-61 (Eng.).
Sections 59-61 of RIPA state:
59.(1) The Prime Minister shall appoint a Commissioner to be known as the
Intelligence Services Commissioner.
(2) Subject to subsection (4), the Intelligence Services Commissioner shall
keep under review, so far as they are not required to be kept under re-
view by the Interception of Communications Commissioner-
(a) the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers under sections 5
to 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (warrants for interference
with wireless telegraphy, entry and interference with property etc.);
(b) the exercise and performance by the Secretary of State, in connec-
tion with or in relation to-
(i) the activities of the intelligence services, and
(ii) the activities in places other than Northern Ireland of the offi-
cials of the Ministry of Defence and of members of Her Maj-
esty's forces, of the powers and duties conferred or imposed on
him by Parts II and III of this Act;
(c) the exercise and performance by members of the intelligence ser-
vices of the powers and duties conferred or imposed on them by or
under Parts II and III of this Act;
(d) the exercise and performance in places other than Northern Ire-
land, by officials of the Ministry of Defence and by members of Her
Majesty's forces, of the powers and duties conferred or imposed on
such officials or members of Her Majesty's forces by or under Parts
II and III; and
(e) the adequacy of the arrangements by virtue of which the duty im-
posed by section 55 is sought to be discharged-
(i) in relation to the members of the intelligence services; and
(ii) in connection with any of their activities in places other than
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Northern Ireland, in relation to officials of the Ministry of De-
fence and members of Her Majesty's forces.
(3) The Intelligence Services Commissioner shall give the Tribunal all such
assistance (including his opinion as to any issue falling to be determined
by the Tribunal) as the Tribunal may require-
(a) in connection with the investigation of any matter by the Tribunal;
or
(b) otherwise for the purposes of the Tribunal's consideration or deter-
mination of any matter.
(4) It shall not be the function of.the Intelligence Services Commissioner to
keep under review the exercise of any power of the Secretary of State to
make, amend or revoke any subordinate legislation.
(5) A person shall not be appointed under this section as the Intelligence
Services Commissioner unless he holds or has held a high judicial office
(within the meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876).
(6) The Intelligence Services Commissioner shall hold office in accordance
with the terms of his appointment; and there shall be paid to him out of
money provided by Parliament such allowances as the Treasury may de-
termine.
(7) The Secretary of State shall, after consultation with the Intelligence Ser-
vices Commissioner and subject to the approval of the Treasury as to
numbers, provide him with such staff as the Secretary of State considers
necessary for the carrying out of the Commissioner's functions.
(8) Section 4 of the Security Service Act 1989 and section 8 of the Intelli-
gence Services Act 1994 (Commissioners for the purposes of those Acts)
shall cease to have effect.
(9) On the coming into force of this section the Commissioner holding of-
fice as the Commissioner under section 8 of the Intelligence Services Act
1994 shall take and hold office as the Intelligence Services Commissioner
as if appointed under this Act-
(a) for the unexpired period of his term of office under that Act; and
(b) otherwise, on the terms of his appointment under that Act.
(10) Subsection (7) of section 41 shall apply for the purposes of this section
as it applies for the purposes of that section.
60. (1) It shall be the duty of-
(a) every member of an intelligence service,
(b) every official of the department of the Secretary of State, and
(c) every member of Her Majesty's forces, to disclose or provide to
the Intelligence Services Commissioner all such documents and
information as he may require for the purpose of enabling him
to carry out his functions under section 59.
(2) As soon as practicable after the end of each calendar year, the Intelli-
gence Services Commissioner shall make a report to the Prime Minister
with respect to the carrying out of that Commissioner's functions.
(3) The Intelligence Services Commissioner may also, at any time, make any
such other report to the Prime Minister on any matter relating to the
carrying out of the Commissioner's functions as the Commissioner
thinks fit.
(4) The Prime Minister shall lay before each House of Parliament a copy of
every annual report made by the Intelligence Services Commissioner
under subsection (2), together with a statement as to whether any matter
has been excluded from that copy in pursuance of subsection (5).
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(5) If it appears to the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Intelli-
gence Services Commissioner, that the publication of any matter in an
annual report would be contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to-
(a) national security,
(b) the prevention or detection of serious crime,
(c) the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, or
(d) the continued discharge of the functions of any public authority
whose activities include activities that are subject to review by that
Commissioner,
the Prime Minister may exclude that matter from the copy of the report
as laid before each House of Parliament.
(6) Subsection (7) of section 41 shall apply for the purposes of this section as
it applies for the purposes of that section.
61.(1) The Prime Minister, after consultation with the First Minister and
deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland, shall appoint a Commis-
sioner to be known as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for
Northern Ireland.
(2) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland shall keep
under review the exercise and performance in Northern Ireland, by the
persons on whom they are conferred or imposed, of any powers or duties
under Part II which are conferred or imposed by virtue of an order
under section 30 made by the Office of the First Minister and deputy
First Minister in Northern Ireland.
(3) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland shall give
the Tribunal all such assistance (including his opinion as to any issue
failing to be determined by the Tribunal) as the Tribunal may require-
(a) in connection with the investigation of any matter by the Tribunal;
or
(b) otherwise for the purposes of the Tribunal's consideration or deter-
mination of any matter.
(4) It shall be the duty of-
(a) every person by whom, or on whose application, there has been
given or granted any authorisation the function of giving or granting
which is subject to review by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner
for Northern Ireland,
(b) every person who has engaged in conduct with the authority of such
an authorisation,
(c) every person who holds or has held any office, rank or position with
the same public authority as a person falling within paragraph (a),
and
(d) every person who holds or has held any office, rank or position with
any public authority for whose benefit (within the meaning of Part
II) activities which are or may be subject to any such review have
been or may be carried out,
to disclose or provide to that Commissioner all such documents and in-
formation as he may require for the purpose of enabling him to carry
out his functions.
(5) As soon as practicable after the end of each calendar year, the Investiga-
tory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland shall make a report to
the First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland with re-
spect to the carrying out of that Commissioner's functions.
(6) The First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland shall lay
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the performance and implementation of CHIS authorization ac-
tivities by the intelligence service, and the Secretary of State. 13 2
At the end of each year, the ICS must submit a report to the
Prime Minister, regarding the fulfillment of his or her func-
tions.133 A duty is placed on all members of the intelligence
forces, as well as on the Secretary of State, to disclose any and all
information that the ICS may require in the process of creating
these reporits. 134 After a report is submitted, to the Prime Minis-
ter by the ICS, both the ICS and Prime Minister have the power
to exclude publication of any material that they determine is not
within the public interest or may negatively impact national se-
curity, hamper the discovery or prevention of significant crimes,
harm the UK's economic interests or impair the abilities of any
individual whose CHIS authorization activities are under the
before the Northern Ireland Assembly a copy of every annual report
made by the' Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland
under subsection (5), together with a statement as to whether any matter
has been excluded from that copy in pursuance of subsection (7).
(7) If it appears to the First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern
Ireland, after consultation with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner
for Northern Ireland, that the publication of any matter in an annual
report would be contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to-
(a) the preventio.n or detection of serious crime, or
(b) the continued discharge of the functions of any public authority
whose activities include activities that are subject to review by that
Commissioner,
they may exclude that matter from the copy of the report as laid before
the Northern Ireland Assembly.
(8) A person shall not be appointed under this section as the Investigatory
Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland unless he holds or has held
office in Northern Ireland-
(a) in any capacity in which he is orlwas the holder of a high judicial
office (within the meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876);
or
(b) as a county court judge.
(9) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland shall hold
office in accordance with the terms of his appointment; and there shall
be paid to him out of the Consolidated Fund of Northern Ireland such
allowances as the Department of Finance and Personnel may determine.
(10) The First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland shall,
after consultation with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for
Northern Ireland, provide him with such staff as they consider necessary
for the carrying out of his functions.
Id.
132. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, pt. IV, § 59(2) (Eng.).
133. See id. § 60(2).
134. See id. § 60(1).
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ICS's review.13 ' The finalized review is then submitted to each
House of Parliament. 13
6
In Northern Ireland, a Commissioner known as the Investi-
gatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland ("IPC") is
also appointed, responsible for duties analogous to the ICS's.
13 v
The IPC reviews the application and execution of all duties asso-
ciated with the CHIS authorization process, within the context of
Northern Ireland. 138 Similar to the ICS, the IPC must make a
report concerning the implementation of the IPC's duties, and
submit that report to the First Minister and deputy First Minister
of Northern Ireland.139 The grounds for exclusion of matters
within that report are more restricted than are afforded the
ICS. 14 ° Upon consultation with the First Minister and deputy
First Minister, the IPC may only exclude matters that are not
within the public interest, may hamper the prevention or discov-
ery of significant crimes, or may impair the ability of any individ-
ual whose CHIS authorization activities are under the IPC's re-
view.141 The final version of this report must then be submitted
to the Northern Ireland Assembly.
1 42
B. The RIPA Tribunal
Part IV of RIPA establishes an independent Tribunal
("RIPA Tribunal") to consider violations of human rights pro-
tected under both RIPA and the Human Rights Act.1 43 Under
sections 68(2) and (3), the RIPA Tribunal must apply the princi-
135. See id. § 60(5).
136. See id. § 60(5).
137. See id. § 61.
138. See id. § 61(2).
139. See id. § 61(6).
140. See id. §§ 60(5), 61(7).
141. See id. § 61(7).
142. See id. § 61(7).
143. See id. § 65, paras. (1)-(3). RIPA provides in Section 65 of the Act:
(1) There shall, for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction conferred on
them by this section, be a tribunal consisting of such number of members
as Her Majesty may by Letters Patent appoint.
(2) The jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be-
(a) to be the only appropriate tribunal for the purposes of section 7 of
the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to any proceedings under sub-
section (1) (a) of that section (proceedings for actions incompatible
with Convention rights) which fall within subsection (3) of this sec-
tion;
(b) to consider and determine any complaints made to them which, in
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ples of judicial review with respect to proceedings considering a
surveillance complaint.114  In accordance with this system, the
RIPA Tribunal may only decide whether the authorization for
the conduct was manifestly unreasonable in the circumstances or
was based on procedural irregularity. 4 In addition, the RIPA
Tribunal does not have to consider or determine any complaint
made more than one year after the conduct to which it relates
occurred. 14 6
Under RIPA, an individual may have standing to bring an
action for the misuse of covert human intelligence if the action
in question took place in relation to him, specifically, and was
carried out by intelligence services. 4 ' However, if the CHIS au-
thorization was authorized by, or takes place with the permission
accordance with subsection (4), are complaints for which the Tribu-
nal is the appropriate forum;
(c) to consider and determine any reference to them by any person that
he has suffered detriment as a consequence of any prohibition or re-
striction, by virtue of section 17, on his relying in, or for the purposes
of, any civil proceedings on any matter; and
(d) to hear and determine any other such proceedings falling within sub-
section (3) as may be allocated to them in accordance with provision
made by the Secretary of State by order.
(3) Proceedings fall within this subsection if -
(a) they are proceedings against any of the intelligence services;
(b) they are proceedings against any other person in respect of any con-
duct, or proposed conduct, by or on behalf of any of those services;
(c) they are proceedings brought by virtue of section 55(4); or
(d) they are proceedings relating to the taking place in any challengeable
circumstances of any conduct falling within subsection (5).
Id.
144. See id. § 67, para. 2. RIPA states in Section 67(2) of the Act:
Where the Tribunal hears any proceedings by virtue of section 65(2) (a), they
shall apply the same principles for making their determination in those pro-
ceedings as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review.
Id.
145. SeeJUSTICE, REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY PowERs BILL: PART IV: SCRUTINY
OF INVESTIGATORY PowERs: HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITrEE STAGE, Apr.
2000, para. 1.9, available at http://www.fipr.org/rip/RP4BRF.doc [hereinafter JUS-
TICE IV] (explaining that RIPA Tribunal cannot consider, for example, either accuracy
or merits of evidence put forward in support of authorization).
146. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, pt. IV, § 67(5) (Eng.).
RIPA provides in Section 67(5):
Except where the Tribunal, having regard to all the circumstances, are satis-
fied that it is equitable to do so, they shall not consider or determine any
complaint made by virtue of section 65 (2) (b) if it is made more than one year
after the taking place of the conduct to which it relates.
Id.
147. See id. § 67(3). RIPA provides in Section 6(3):
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of, a judicial authority, it may not be brought as a complaint in
the RIPA Tribunal. a48 The RIPA Tribunal also has sole jurisdic-
tion as to the cases that may be brought before it.149 The Secre-
tary of State oversees the RIPA Tribunal proceedings. 150
The right to appeal within the RIPA Tribunal is also lim-
ited.1 51 The determinations, awards, orders, and other decisions
(3) Where the Tribunal considers a complaint made to them by virtue of sec-
tion 65(2) (b), it shall be the duty of the Tribunal-
(a) to investigate whether the persons against whom any allegations are
made in the complaint have engaged, in relation to-
(i) the complainant,
(ii) any of his property,
(iii) any communications sent by or to him, or intended for him, or
(iv) his use of any postal service, telecommunications service or tele-
communication system, in any conduct falling within section
65(5);
(b) to investigate the authority (if any) for any conduct falling within sec-
tion 65(5) which they find has been so engaged in; and
(c) in relation to the Tribunals' findings from their investigations, to de-
termine the complaint by applying the same principles as would be
applied by a court on application for judicial review.
Id. Section 65(5) of RIPA provides:
Subject to subsection (6), conduct falls within this subsection if (whenever it
occurred) it is-
(a) conduct by or on behalf of any of the intelligence services;
(b) conduct for or in connection with the interception of communications in
the course of their transmission by means of a postal service or telecom-
munication system;
(c) conduct to which Chapter II of Part I applies;
(d) conduct to which Part II applies;
(e) the giving of a notice under section 49 or any disclosure or use of a key to
protected information;
(f) any entry or interference with property or any interference with wireless
telegraphy.
Id.
148. See id. § 65(7). RIPA provides:
For the purposes of this section conduct takes place in challengeable circum-
stances if-
(a) it takes place with the authority, or purported authority, or anything fall-
ing within subsection (8); or
(b) the circumstances are such that (whether or not there is such authority) it
would not have been appropriate for the conduct to take place without it,
or at least without proper consideration having been given to whether
such authority should be sought; but conduct does not take place in chal-
lengeable circumstances to the extent that it is authorised by, or takes
place with the permission of, a judicial authority.
Id.
149. See id. § 65(1)-(3).
150. See id. § 65(2)(d).
151. See id. § 67(8)-(11). RIPA provides in Section 67(8)-(11):
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of the RIPA Tribunal (including decisions as to whether they
have jurisdiction) are not subject to appeal in any court.1 12 The
Secretary of State, however, has authority to amend these provi-
sions.153
C. Criticisms of RIPA
Despite RIPA's attempts to guarantee that the use of covert
human surveillance will be used in accordance with human
rights obligations, a number of commentators believe that the
framework established by RIPA is inadequate in protecting those
rights.' 54  Some major criticism of RIPA include: the broad
(8) Except to such extent as the Secretary of State may by order otherwise
provide, determinations, awards, orders and other decision of the Tribu-
nal (including decisions as to whether they have jurisdiction) shall not
be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in any court.
(9) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to Secure that there is at all
times an order under subsection (8) in force allowing for an appeal to a
court against any exercise by the Tribunal of their jurisdiction under
section 65(2) (c) or (d).
(10) The provision that may be contained in an order under subsection (8)
may include-
(a) provision for the establishment and membership of a tribunal or
body to hear appeals;
(b) the appointment of persons to that tribunal or body and provision
about the remuneration and allowances to be payable to such per-
sons and the expense of the tribunal;
(c) the conferring of jurisdiction to hear appeals on any existing court
or tribunal; and
(d) any such provision in relation to any appeal under the order as cor-
responds to provision that may be made by rules under section 69 in
relation to proceedings before the Tribunal, or to complaints or ref-
erences made to the Tribunal.
(11) The Secretary of State shall not make an order under subsection (8)
unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved
by a resolution of each House.
Id.
152. See id. § 65(1)-(3).
153. See id. § 65(2)(d).
154. See Gillespie, supra note 15 (stating that RIPA will likely not meet "quality of
law" test inherent in Article 8(2) of European Convention); see also Akdeniz, supra note
110, at 11 (stating that RIPA is weak in responding to privacy issues); Open Letter by
Amnesty International to Members of the House of Lords on The Regulation of Investi-
gatory Powers Bill, (June 13, 2000), available at www.fipr.org/rip/AmnestyRIPletter.htm
[hereinafter Amnesty Int'l Open Letter] (stating that RIPA fails to provide sufficient
safeguards ensuring accountability and protection of human rights). See generally JUS-
TICE, SUBMISSIONS ON THE DRATr CODES OF PRACTICE UNDER THE REGULATION OF INVES-
TIGATORY POWERS ACT 2000: THE COVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES DRAFT CODE
OF PRACTICE UNDER RIPA (2000) [hereinafter JUSTICE DRAFT CODES] (detailing areas
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grounds upon which a CHIS authorization may be issued; RIPA's
internal, executive authorizations; the standards of review within
the RIPA Tribunal; and the degree to which the RIPA Tribunal
can provide an effective remedy, given the secretive nature of
covert human surveillance activities.
155
1. Human Rights Concerns Regarding
Informer Authorizations
RIPA provides for substantive approval of a CHIS activity for
a wide range of purposes, varying from protection of national
security to collection of taxes or other duties.156 Critics ex-
pressed concern over the wide latitude of surveillance authoriza-
tion justifications under RIPA.1 57 Unease over the clarity of the
definition led at least one commentator to question whether
RIPA's standards meet the requirements under Kruslin v. France
to provide "clear and detailed rules" in the statutory CHIS au-
thorization. 158
Commentators also criticized RIPA's almost entirely inter-
that may lead to human rights violations in RIPA Codes of Practice); Liberty, Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Bill: Second Reading Briefing, House of Lords, May 2000, available at
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/mlobby2h.html (listing potential human
rights deficiencies in RIPA).
155. See Amnesty Int'l Open Letter, supra note 154 (expressing concern over
broad means upon which CHIS authorization may be issued); see also Akdeniz, supra
note 110, at 82 (criticizing lack of independent judicial review accorded to CHIS au-
thorization system under RIPA); JUSTICE IV, supra note 145, para. 1.10 (questioning
whether application of judicial review principles in RIPA Tribunal are sufficient for
purposes of providing adequate remedy).
156. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, pt. II, § 29, paras. 2-3 (Eng.)
(providing that CHIS activity can be approved if it is within interest of national security,
is for purpose of preventing or detecting crime, is in interests of UK's economic well-
being, is in interest of public safety, is for purpose of protecting public health, is for
purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other imposition payable to
government department or for any purpose specified by Secretary of State).
157. See Amnesty Int'l Open Letter, supra note 154 (expressing apprehension that
broad provisions of RIPA's authorizations could leave it open to wide abuses). Amnesty
International articulated concerns that RIPA's provisions could lead to targeting indi-
viduals wrongly for political purposes Id. SeeJUSTICE II, supra note 87, para. 3.9, (crit-
icizing broad grounds upon which CHIS authorization may be issued, given the power
this would provide authorizing authority); Liberty, supra note 154 (considering broad
set of grounds for CHIS authorization under RIPA to be concerning because of its
potential for intrusiveness).
158. See Kruslin v. France, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 (1990), para. 1 (holding that
having clear and detailed positive rules is essential for governing covert surveillance,
given contemporary advances in technology).
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nal authorizations. 5 9 Experts noted that there is no duty or stat-
utory procedure under which police may seek prior judicial ap-
proval for a CHIS authorization. 6 ' Judicial oversight, when im-
plemented, only occurs retrospectively.161  At least one
organization noted that this practice stands in contrast with the
standards set by the European Court in Kopp v. Switzerland.16 2
2. Human Rights Concerns Regarding the RIPA Tribunal
The provisions of RIPA allow individuals to file a complaint
with the RIPA Tribunal when the individual has been the subject
of surveillance via the use of a CHIS.163 In reviewing these com-
plaints the Tribunal will apply principles of judicial review, 1 64
only deciding whether the authorization for the conduct was
strikingly irrational or based on procedural abnormalities. 165
159. See Akdeniz, supra note 110, at 82 (noting that lack of independent judicial
authorization for informers in RIPA renders it challengeable under Human Rights
Act); see also Gillespie, supra note 15 (noting that lack of independent judicial overview
of RIPA CHIS authorizations leaves system open to abuse); JUSTICE II, supra note 87,
para. 4.10 (questioning whether internal self-authorization of RIPA would meet Kopp
standard); Neyroud & Beckley, supra note 15, at 171 (questioning whether RIPA's lack
of prior judicial oversight will meet human rights standards); JUSTICE DRA-r CODES,
supra note 154, para. 11 (contending that internal authorization is unnecessary in or-
ganization as large as police force).
160. See Gillespie, supra note 15 (noting that lack of opportunity for prior judicial
approval in CHIS authorizations is different from system implemented in RIPA when
authorizing other forms of surveillance); see alsoJUSTICE II, supra note 87, para. 4.10
(contending that lack of independent judicial approval for CHIS authorizations is con-
trary to standards set by European Court); Neyroud & Beckley, supra note 15, at 171
(questioning whether RIPA's lack of prior judicial oversight in granting CHIS authori-
zations would be acceptable in other European and international contexts); Amnesty
International Open Letter, supra note 154 (expressing concern that judicial authoriza-
tion not necessary to grant CHIS authorization under RIPA).
161. See Gillespie, supra note 15 (noting that no concurrent judicial. oversight ex-
ists in CHIS authorization process); see also JUSTICE II, supra note 87, para. 4.10 (con-
tending that lack of supervision of covert surveillance by independentjudicial body may
contradict European Court requirements); Amnesty International Open Letter, supra
note 154 (arguing that lack of independent judicial supervision in CHIS authorization
process does not address past problems with controlling officers who may attempt to
violate law).
162. SeeJUSTICE II, supra note 87, at 4.10 (questioning whether internal executive
authorizations allowed for under RIPA constitute necessary precaution in protecting
right to privacy, as defined under Kopp holding, given lack of supervision by 'indepen-
dent judicial authority).
163. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, pt. IV, § 65 (Eng.).
164. See id. pt. IV, § 59 (2)-(3).
165. SeeJUSTICE IV, supra note 145, para. 1.9 (defining judicial review in terms of
its inability to address case merits).
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Commentators question whether the standards of review used by
the RIPA Tribunal are truly compatible with the holdings in
both Chahal'6 6 and Tinnelly,' 67 and, implicitly, Article 13 of the
European Convention.16
Other critics of RIPA question how effective a complaints
tribunal can be, given that the subject is likely unaware that he
or she is under surveillance.169 Critics argue that such com-
plaints procedures may violate Article 13 of the European Con-
vention, given its limited possibilities of providing an effective
remedy. 170 A number of commentators have also expressed con-
cern that the RIPA Tribunal will function solely as a human
rights "smoke-screen." 171 The RIPA Tribunal was modeled on
already existing complaints tribunals that are harshly criticized
as ineffective in providing adequate remedies. 72
166. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413 (1996) (finding that
mere application ofjudicial review principles in asylum case, where judicial review fails
to allow Tribunal to assess factual basis of case, inadequate remedy for purposes of
Article 13).
167. See Tinnelly & Sons Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 249 (1999)
(holding that inability to consider merits of case involving civil right is violative of Arti-
cle 13 of European Convention).
168. See JUSTICE IV, supra note 145, para. 1.10 (questioning whether merely ap-
plying judicial review principles to cases involving CHIS would provide adequate rem-
edy, given holdings in Chahal and Tinnelly); see also Liberty, supra note 154 (maintaining
that application of mere judicial review principles in RIPA Tribunal violate Article 6
European Convention requirements).
169. See Amnesty Int'l Open Letter, supra note 154 (contending that complaints
tribunal regarding CHIS is ineffective, given that individual is likely unaware that covert
monitoring is taking place); JUSTICE IV, supra note 145, para. 2.1 (discussing difficulty
of discovering one's surveillance, given nature of CHIS activity).
170. See JUSTICE IV, supra note 145, para. 2.1 (stating that RIPA Tribunal does
not meet Article 8 requirement of providing effective remedy for breach of right to
privacy, given inability for majority of individuals under surveillance to become aware of
monitoring); see also Amnesty Int'l Open Letter, supra note 154 (urging UK to adopt
type of notification procedure, similar to procedures employed by other countries, that
allows individual to be put on notice regarding surveillance after fact).
171. SeeJUSTICE IV, Supra note 145, para. 1.6 (stating concern about RIPA Tribu-
nal's effectiveness in providing adequate remedy for possible European Convention
rights); see also Akdeniz, supra note 110, at 90 (questioning whetherjudicial review stan-
dards employed by RIPA Tribunal will provide effective remedy).
172. See Norton-Taylor & Hopkins, supra note 14 (explaining that RIPA Tribunal
patterned after tribunal covering complaints of MI5 activities, which, has never upheld
complaint, after receiving hundreds of cases); see also Akdeniz, supra note 110, at 90
(explaining that RIPA was modelled on previously existing complaints tribunals in
which no complaint brought have ever been upheld); JUSTICE IV, supra note 145,
para. 1.6 (contending that failure of surveillance tribunals that RIPA was modeled on,
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III. THE FINUCANE CASE IN LIGHT OF RIPA
The murder of Patrick Finucane and the surrounding alle-
gations of official collusion into his killing present a dramatic
example of how systemic corruption may take place within a
structure of unaccountable entities.1 3 In light of RIPA, then,
the question becomes: Will RIPA correct the pervasive systemic
problems evident during the time of Finucane's killing? Will
RIPA protect others, like Finucane, against future human rights
abuses? The answer is partially yes, and partially no.
A. CHIS Authorizations
RIPA is an Act that purports to incorporate the principles of
the European Convention into a domestic framework governing
the use of informers.174 The intention is a good one, and efforts
at creating such a system of accountability are apparent. RIPA
creates a number of structural safeguards on both the higher
and lower levels of the CHIS authorization process. 175 On the
more basic level, RIPA guarantees maintenance of the CHIS ac-
tivity by assigning to an authority daily responsibilities for deal-
ing with the source and the source's security and welfare,17 6 by
installing general oversight of the use of a source, 17 7 and by cre-
ating a system of record maintenance regarding the activities of
the source.' 78 In addition, RIPA creates criteria upon which a
CHIS authorization may be issued.1 79
RIPA also provides a broader system of overview by creating
reveals gravity of concern that RIPA Tribunal will also be ineffective in proving ade-
quate remedies).
173. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing that many individuals
allegedly involved in murder of Patrick Finucane have remained unaccountable for
their actions).
174. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (stating RIPA's goal).
175. See supra notes 120-42 and accompanying text (describing system of safe-
guards installed in course of CHIS activity).
176. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (detailing responsibilities of au-
thority holding daily responsibilities of CHIS).
177. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing responsibilities of au-
thority maintaining general oversight of CHIS).
178. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (describing RIPA's standards of
record keeping).
179. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (stating list of criteria upon
which CHIS authorization may be issued).
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positions like the IPC and ICS.' 8 ° Both of these positions ensure
that the use of surveillance is accomplished in accordance with
stated procedures. 81 The annual reports that each of these au-
thorities must submit to either Parliament or the Northern Ire-
land Assembly provides an even further check on the CHIS sys-
tem.1
82
However, the sort of internal, executive authorization that
was practiced during the time of Patrick Finucane's murder re-
mains. 18  The European Court, in cases like Kopp, harshly criti-
cized the use of internal, executive authorization because such a
lack of external monitoring could lead to corruption' 84 -Finu-
cane's case being the worst example of such corruption. By al-
lowing for internal, executive authorization, RIPA violates the
Kopp standard, thereby violating the European Convention, as
well.
The potential for corruption left open through RIPA's in-
ternal, executive authorizations, is further heightened by the
broad language upon which CHIS authorizations may be is-
sued. 185 As previously noted, a number of human rights observ-
ers have been justifiably concerned that the broad discretion
that RIPA provides authorizing authorities could leave such au-
thorizations open to abuse.'86 Looking at RIPA's substantive
standard for CHIS authorizations, it is difficult to imagine any
but the most extreme of circumstances that would not meet
RIPA's requirements. 87 The vagueness of RIPA's standard for
authorization seems also to be in violation of the European
Court's requirement to have "clear and detailed" rules gov-
180. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing creation of posts of IPC
and ICS under RIPA).
181. See supra notes 132, 138 and accompanying text (describing responsiblities of
IPC and ICS under RIPA).
182. See supa notes 133, 139 and accompanying text (stating responsibiliy of IPC
and ICS to create annual reports on CHIS activities).
183. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting that informer authoriza-
tion under RIPA almost entirely internal).
184. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing holding of Kopp).
185. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (listing criteria upon which CHIS
authorization may be issued).
186. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (noting human rights criticisms of
practice of internal, executive authorization).
187. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (detailing grounds upon which
CHIS authorization may be issued).
2002] POLICING UNDERCOVER AGENTS IN THE UK
erning authorization of covert activities.188
Though RIPA makes some effort at the authorization level
to create a system of accountability, several of its provisions leave
RIPA open to types of systemic abuses evident before the passage
of RIPA. 1 9 RIPA's practices of internal, executive authorization
and the unclear standards set for the authorizations further fail
to pass the tests established by European Court decisions. t 0
B. RIPA Tribunal
RIPA additionally tries to create a system of accountability
to address possible abuses within the CHIS authorization system
by creating a tribunal to handle possible wrongdoings. 9 ' The
RIPA Tribunal is notable as an institutional safeguard serving as
a retrospective check on CHIS procedures. However, the poten-
tial for abuses left open at the authorization level may be perpet-
uated through the low standard of judicial review that the RIPA
Tribunal uses to address cases.1 92 Because the RIPA Tribunal
may only decide whether an authorization for the conduct was
manifestly unreasonable or based on procedural. irregularity, t93
it is difficult for the RIPA Tribunal to adequately address the
potential corruptions at the authorization level. The holdings in
cases like Smith and Grady and Chahal seem to support the idea
that the RIPA Tribunal's standard of review would fail to meet
the effective remedy requirements of Article 13.194
While it is clear that the corruption that characterized the
CHIS system at. the time of Finucane's murder is improved
through RIPA, the potential for abuses and corruption in the
system remains. Until these concerns are met, it is questionable
188. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of Euro-
pean Court to use clear language in informer authorization process).
189. See supra notes 49-70 and accompanying text (providing example of abuses
that occurred in use of covert surveillance in time before RIPA's passage).
190. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text (detailing standards created by
European Court regarding authorization of covert surveillance activities).
191. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing creation of RIPA Tribu-
nal as way to consider human rights violations).
192. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (describing judicial review stan-
dards).
193. See id.
194. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (discussing holdings of Smith
and Grady and Chahal).
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whether RIPA can accurately claim to be the guarantor of
human rights it purports to be.
CONCLUSION
RIPA is a law with good intentions. Working to promote the
values expressed in the UK's Human Rights Act, RIPA's goal is to
better promote human rights in the UK's domestic legal system.
RIPA does, however, have a number of shortcomings. These
shortcomings must be corrected in order to avoid the circum-
stances that allowed Patrick Finucane to be murdered.
